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This  paper  considers the  effects of  fiscal policy  on  private  consumption  in  a 
framework that  encompasses both  the conventional (Keynesian) view  of  fiscal 
policy  and  the  Ricardian  debt  neutrality  hypothesis.  The  model  is  built  on 
Blanchard's  stochastic model  of  intertemporal optimization  with  finitely lived 
consumers.  As  an  extension  to  the  basic  framework  public  consumption  is 
explicitly incorporated in the model. The model nests also the excess sensitivity 
hypothesis  whereby  the  role  of  current  income  on  consumption  can  be 
investigated. Empirical analyses are based on annual data from ten EU countries 
covering the years 196  1  -  1994 and use the nonlinear instrumental variable GMM 
estimator both in country-specific and panel estimations. The tests reject clearly 
the Ricardian debt neutrality for majority of the countries in the sample. Moreover, 
deviations  from  Ricardian  neutrality  seem  to  arise  from  excess  sensitivity  of 
consumption to current income rather than from a finite planning horizon on the 
part of consumers. The results also suggest that in the consumers' utility functions, 
government  consumption  and  private  consumption  tend  to  be  unrelated  or 
complements rather than substitutes. 
Keywords: private  consumption,  private  saving, current  income,  fiscal  policy, 
planning horizon 
Tiivis  telma 
Tutkimuksessa  arvioidaan  finanssipolitiikan - verotuksen,  budjettialijaaman ja 
julkisen  kulutuksen - vaikutusta talouteen yksityisen kulutuksen ja  saastamisen 
nakokulmasta. Tutkimuksen keskeisena pyrkimyksena on selvittaa, tukevatko em- 
piiriset  havainnot perinteista  keynesilaista lahestymistapaa vai  Ricardon  velka- 
neutraliteettihypoteesia, jonka mukaan finanssipolitiikka on tehotonta: velalla ra- 
hoitettu verojen alentaminen eli budjettialijaaman kasvu ei lisaa yksityista kulutus- 
ta eika siten ole taloutta elvyttavaa Tutkimus perustuu ajan yli optimoivan kulut- 
tajan mallille, jossa kuluttajien suunnitteluhorisontti on aiirellinen ja jossa kulutus 
riippuu odotetusta elinikaisesta varallisuudesta. Julkinen kulutus vaikuttaa mallis- 
sa yksityisen kulutuksen aikauraan sikali kuin silla on vaikutusta kotitalouksien 
kokemaan hyvinvointiin. Empiirinen aineisto kasittaa kymmenen EU-maata ja kat- 
taa vuodet  196  1  -  1994. Analyysimenetelmana on kaytetty epalineaarista  instru- menttimuuttujamenetelmaa (GMM). Tulokset hylkaavat Ricardon velkaneutrali- 
teettihypoteesin lahes kaikissa maissa. Hylkaaminen ei nayttiiisi niinkaan johtuvan 
kuluttajien ahellisen suunnitteluhorisontin kuin kulutuksen ja nykyhetken tulojen 
valisen voimakkaan riippuvuuden takia. Tulosten mukaan julkinen kulutus ja yksi- 
tyinen kulutus ovat kuluttajien hyotyfunktioissa paremminkin riippumattomia tai 
toisiaan taydentavia kuin toisiaan korvaavia. 
Asiasanat:  yksityinen  kulutus,  yksityinen  saastaminen, tulot,  finanssipolitiikka, 
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Large and persistent budget deficits and increasing government indebtedness have 
been among the most important topics in economic policy discussions worldwide 
since  the  late  1970s. Recently the  issue has  gained even  a  stronger emphasis 
especially in Europe as the member countries of  the European Union strive to 
consolidate  public  finances  in  order  to  meet  the  fiscal  convergence  criteria 
required for the participation to the third stage of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union. Despite the growing interest of policy makers and economists in 
the  sustainability and  efficiency of  fiscal policy,  neither  economic  theory  nor 
empirical evidence give any clear cut answers to these issues. In fact, there exists 
sharp controversies on the effects of fiscal policy in general and of budget deficits 
in particular. 
Most  of  the  debate  centers  around  the  the  question  whether  government 
financing  decisions  influence  private  consumption  and  saving  or  not.  At  the 
present state of  inquiry, the  answer to this question depends ultimately on the 
degree to which consumers treat government debt as net wealth. According to the 
conventional (Keynesian) view, that formed a consensus opinion until the 1970s, 
private  sector perceives government bonds totally as net wealth. Consequently, 
government deficits have a stong stimulative effect on private consumption and 
aggregate demand particularly in the short run. The resulting decrease in private 
and national  saving lead, however, to  higher real  interest rates that crowd out 
private  investment  and  thereby  reduce  the  long  run  growth  potential  of  the 
economy. The long run negative effects offset thus at least partially the positive 
short run effects. An important thing to note is that the stimulating effects of  the 
fiscal  deficits  in  this  conventional  approach are entirely based  on  an  implicit 
assumption that consumers are too myopic to account for the future fiscal policy 
implications of current debt accumulation. 
The  Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the 
conventional view by arguing that government deficit financing merely generates 
the private saving necessary to absorb the  additional government debt, leaving 
national  saving  and  interest  rates,  investment  and  output  unaltered.  Ricardian 
equivalence holds since an increase in private sector savings will exactly offset the 
rising government deficit.' This result is formally based on Barro's (1974) seminal 
paper. By introducing rational behaviour and fiscal expectations into a forward- 
looking  permanent  income-life  cycle  consumption  model  he  showed  that 
intertemporally maximizing rational consumers will not view government debt as 
a part of their net wealth if they accurately anticipate the future tax liability of that 
debt. Instead, rational consumers would realize that the public debt created now by 
government borrowing must be repaid in the future by an increase in taxes. Private 
consumption remains unchanged provided that the present value of  government 
expenditures is not affected by the choice of budget deficits and surpluses, ie by 
the timing of  taxes. Lowering of  taxes today  will merely induce consumers to 
'Recently,  there has emerged also a third  line of  reasoning called non- or anti-Keynesian view 
stating that with high government debtIGDP ratios and large budget deficits, contractionary fiscal 
policies may  have expansionary effect on private consumption, see Bertola and Drazen (1993), 
Sutherland (1995), and for empirical evidence Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1995). increase saving in order to avoid sharp decline in their future disposable income 
and consumption due to higher  taxes. If  this is a correct representation of  the 
consumer behaviour, the Ricardian equivalence proposition leads to quite drastic 
policy implications: since a switch from tax financing to debt financing has no 
stimulating  effect on  the economy even in  the  short run,  attempts to stabilize 
economy are doomed to be futile. 
As in the case of budget deficits there exist different views concerning the 
effects of government consumption on economic a~tivity.~  Under the conventional 
approach changes in government consumption have no  direct effect on private 
consumption  since  consumers'  current  disposable  income  remains  unaltered. 
However,  on  aggregate  demand  they  will  have  one-to-one  effect.  Ricardian 
equivalence, on  the  other  hand,  suggests that  government  consumption  has  a 
negative but less than one-to-one impact on private consumption. Feldstein (1982) 
goes  even  further  than  the  Ricardian  equivalence  proposition  suggesting  a 
complete ex ante  crowding  out  of  private  consumption  implying that  current 
changes in government consumption must induce an equal, but opposite shift in 
private  consumption,  ie  by  increasing  government  consumption  one  cannot 
increase aggregate demand. This extreme view leaves then no room for short run 
fiscal policy stabilization. 
Barro demonstrated that Ricardian equivalence holds if consumers and the 
government  have  the  same  effective  time  or  planning  horizonY3  taxes  are 
nondistortionary, capital markets are perfect with no borrowing constraints and 
there  is full certainty about the path  of  incomes, future taxes  and  government 
expenditure. Thus, Ricardian equivalence requires several restrictive assumptions 
about the economic environment and the behaviour of  consumers. By  relaxing 
'The  seminal contribution of the effects of  government consumption on private consumption and 
aggregate economic activity is Bailey (1971). The impact of  government consumption on private 
consumption depends upon whether government consumption increases or decreases the marginal 
utility of private consumption, ie whether government consumption is an Edgeworth complement or 
substitute for private consumption. Studies based  on Bailey's  approach,  see Kormendi  (1983), 
Barro (1981), Aschauer (1985), Leiderman and  Razin  (1988), Haug (1990), Karras (1994), Ni 
(1995), Evans and Karras (1996). 
3The models  on  Ricardian  equivalence  generally  assume  that  the  consumers  as  well  as  the 
government have an infinite planning horizon. This is not,  however,  a necessary condition for 
Ricardian equivalence to hold. The sufficient condition is that consumers have the same planning 
horizon  as the government, ie the period that  takes to levy the taxes associated with  the debt 
service. If  consumers' planning horizon is shorter than that of the government (eg finite horizon) so 
that part of the debt is shifted to the future generations or if consumers do not fully perceive the 
future tax implications of the current debt issue (eg consumers are to some extent myopic), the 
anticipation of future debt service obligations only partially offsets the value of the debt and there 
will be a net wealth effect leading to an increase in private consumption and interest rates (different 
discount rates, see Feldstein 1982). Barro (1974), however, asserted that the planning horizon in 
this context is irrelevant; individuals will act as if  they lived forever because they are linked to 
future generations through a chain of altruistic bequests. Intergenerational altruism leads to debt 
neutrality.  When  the  assumption  of  operative  bequests  is  dropped,  it  is  clear  that  a  tax  cut 
represents  an  increase in  lifetime wealth,  which  therefore could be  expected  to cause a small 
increase in consumption in the current and future years. A tax cut that is known to be permanent 
would of  course imply a much larger increase in  lifetime wealth and would therefore include a 
much larger immediate increase in consumption (see Feldstein 1982; Haque 1988). For a detailed 
discussion  about the assumptions required for the Ricardian equivalence to hold, see Bernheim 
(1987), Leiderman and Blejer (1988), Seater (1993). these assumptions (or some of them) not only does Ricardian equivalence breake 
down but  non-conventional and, especially, non-Keynesian results also start to 
emerge.4 Moreover,  deviations  from  debt  neutrality  occur  if  the  changes  in 
taxation  are  accompanied  by  shifts  in  government  spending  andlor  transfer 
payments, monetization of government debt, or in both. All in all, the conventional 
Keynesian predictions can be  obtained also in  the intertemporal maximization 
framework with rational expectations. 
Although Ricardian  equivalence is based  on  several restrictive and highly 
unrealistic assumptions it provides  a better starting point  for analyzing overall 
effects  of  fiscal policy  on private  consumption than the conventional view by 
taking  into account the expectations of  future fiscal policy.  In  an environmont 
where the concern about the sound fiscal policies is deepening and the need for 
fiscal  adjustment  is  widely  recognized,  it  is  plausible to  assume  that  private 
consumers are influenced not only by current fiscal policy but also by anticipations 
about the  future path  of  government budget  variables. However, the extent  to 
which consumers foresee future taxes or any other fiscal measures associated with 
current issues of government debt is essentially an empirical question and cannot 
be resolved by  theoretical argumentation. This applies equally to the degree of 
substitutability between private and government consumption. 
1.1  Empirical support to various hypotheses 
After Barro's (1974) Ricardian equivalence or debt neutrality proposition there has 
emerged a considerable amount of empirical reseach on the effects of fiscal policy 
on  private  consumption  and  aggregate  demand.  Basically,  the  studies  testing 
Ricardian equivalence has been carried out in two ways: to test whether increases 
in government debt are perceived as increases in household wealth and in private 
consumption or alternatively whether larger budget  deficits are associated with 
higher interest ratesa5  Here the focus is on the first group of  studies testing the 
response of private consumption to government budget variables. 
The  overwhelming part  of  these  studies  considers  the  data  for  only  one 
country, usually the US.6 The empirical evidence received is,  however, highly 
4 For detailed discussions of  the literature, see Barro (1989a), Bernheim (1987), Leiderman and 
Blejer (1988) and Seater (1993). 
'Evans  (1985), Plosser  (1987), Barro  (1989a), Correia, Nunes  and  Stemitsiotis (1995). Barro 
(1989a) suggests that "overall, the empirical results on interest rates support the Ricardian view. 
Given these findings it is remarkable that most macro economists remain confident that budget 
deficits raise interest rates." 
6The exceptions using data from several countries include Nicoletti (1988), Haque (1988), Evans 
(1993) and Evans and Karras (1996). contr~versial.~  There are several reasons for mixed results: they are sensitive to the 
sample  period,  measurement  of  variables  and  variables  included,  and  the 
estimation methods used.8 Some of the major problems related to most empirical 
specifications of  Ricardian  equivalence can  be  characterized as  follows. First, 
theoretical  equations that are expressed in terms of  expected future values, are 
often approximated in the empirical equations by a distributed lag on realized past 
values (see Haug (1990)).9 Second, most of the studies do not estimate regression 
equations  that  derive  from  well-specified  theoretical  models  nesting  both 
Ricardian  equivalence  and  an  alternative theory  in  which  budget  deficits  and 
current  taxes  are  not  equivalent  (see Evans  (1988,  1993)). Consequently,  the 
results  obtained  are  hard  to  interpret.  Moreover,  most  of  the  literature  uses 
nonrational  expectations aggregate consumption function that is fundamentally 
inconsistent  with  the  Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis  (see  Flavin  (1987)). 
Ricardian  equivalence requires intertemporal  utility  maximization  and  rational 
expectations that together yield an Euler equation specification.1° Third, it is not 
usually established whether the underlying permanent income model is supported 
by  the data (the notable exception being Haug  1990, 1996). Fourth, conflicting 
results may result from the various measures of private consumption used in the 
estimations (see Graham (1  992)). 
On  the basis  of  his  recent  literature  survey Seater  (1993) concludes that 
Ricardian equivalence holds as a close approximation despite its nearly certain 
invalidity  as  a  literal  description of  the  role  of  public  debt  in  the  economy. 
Although there appears to exist much empirical evidence suggesting the rejection 
of Ricardian equivalence, a large part of it fails to attend to econometric problems 
related  to  specification,  simultaneity,  and  data  stationarity,  as  well  as  to 
measurement of quantities involved. He holds that much of the published evidence 
on  Ricardian  equivalence,  both  supportive  and  contradictory,  is  therefore 
sufficiently  flawed  to  be  uninformative.  He  also  points  out  that  Ricardian 
equivalence appears true only under historical fiscal regimes. If  societies change 
their behaviour with respect to public debt, significant effects of the debt might 
emerge.  When  considering  whether  the  Ricardian  equivalence  is  a  good 
approximation to reality on the basis of  a more recent evidence the conclusion, 
'Evidence  consistent with  Ricardian  debt  neutrality  or  tax  disconting hypothesis  and  rational 
expectations includes Seater (1982), Kormendi  (1983), Aschauer  (1985), Seater and  Mariano 
(1985), Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990), Haque (1988), Leiderman and Razin (1988), Evans 
(1988), Evans and  Hasan  (1994), Brunila  (1996). Contradictory or  mixed  results are found  in 
Feldstein  (1982), Blinder and  Deaton (1985), Modigliani and  Sterling (1986, 1990), Bernheim 
(1987), Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990), Haug (1990), Graham and Himarios (1991, 1996), Evans 
(1993), Himarios (1995), Evans and Karras (1996), Ghatak and Ghatak (1996). 
'For  the detailed discussion on the questions concerning the estimation methods or those related to 
the measurement of variables, see Bernheim (1987), Leiderman and Blejer (1988), Graham (1992), 
Seater (1993), Himarios (1995) and Graham and Himarios (1996). 
'Studies  of  Aschauer  (1985), Evans  (1988), Haug  (1990)  and  Ghatak and  Ghatak (1996) are 
exceptions. 
l00nly  Aschauer (1985), Evans (1988), Haque (1988) and Leiderman and Razin (1988) follow such 
a procedure in the literature prior the 1990s. The more recent studies are almost invariably based on 
intertemporal utility maximization, eg Haug (1990, 1996), Graham and Himarios (1991, 1996), 
Evans (1993), Evans and Hasan (1994), Evans and Karras (1996). however, seems to be opposite to that of Seater. Recent studies avoid also many of 
the weaknesses cited by Seater. 
As regards to the degree of substitutability between private and government 
consumption the consensus opinion until the 1990s seems to have been that there 
is a degree of substitutability between public and private consumption. The more 
recent  studies have, however,  found that  private  consumption and government 
consumption tend to be rather complements than  substitutes."  The results have 
proved  to  be  particularly  sensitive  to  empirical  specification  used  and  the 
measurement of variables (see Ni (1995)). Furthermore, since private consumption 
as  well  as  government  consumption  are  both  extremely  heterogeneous,  the 
observed substitutability or complementarity might be related to the composition 
of  these  variables  (see  Evans  and  Karras  (1996)).  As  some  components  of 
government  consumption  are  perceived  as  close  substitutes  for  private 
consumption, some might be perceived as complements, and some as unrelated, it 
is evident that the composition of government consumption matters. 
Since the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is essentially a generalization of 
the  permanent  income  hypohesis  one  should  test  whether  the  underlying 
permanent  income hypothesis is  supported by  the data before any far reaching 
conclusions  on  the  validity  of  Ricardian equivalence  can  be  made.  Since the 
seminal work of Hall (1978), there has been an extensive empirical literature that 
has provided tests of the permanent income hypothesis. Almost all of this work 
has  concluded  that  the  permanent income hypothesis  is  not  supported by  the 
aggregate time series data on the ground that consumption has been found to be 
more sensitive to fluctuations in current income than predicted by the permanent 
income models. Much of this work has been devoted to estimating the fraction of 
income  or  consumption  accruing  from  consumers  who  do  not  follow  the 
permanent  income hypothesis.12 The existence of  these non-optimizing rule of 
thumb consumrs has in turn been explained by liquidity constraints, although no 
direct evidence supporting this explanation is given. 
Jappelli and Pagano (1989) using this method for an international time series 
data  found that  the  fraction of  consumption falling  on  non-optimizing rule  of 
thumb consumers vary widely across countries, roughly from 40 per cent to 60 per 
cent.  Similar  results  on  international  data  was  also  found  in  Bayomi  and 
Koujianou (1989). For the aggregate US data the fraction of income going to rule 
of  thumb  consumers  appears to be  in the range of  30 per cent to 50 per  cent 
(Campbell and Mankiw (1989,  1990), Cushing (1992)). Campbell and Mankiw 
(1991) found that the estimates range from 20 per cent in Canada, through 35 per 
"Evidence supporting the view that government consumption substitutes for private consumption is 
presented in  Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Graham and Himarios (1991), Brunila (1996). 
The opposite result implying that government consumption complements private consumption was 
found in  Leiderman and Razin (1988), Haug  (1990), Karras (1994), Evans and  Karras (1996), 
Brunila (1997). In contrast to these, Modigliani and Sterling (1986, 1990), Feldstein and Elmendorf 
(1990) and Graham and Himarios (1991) found virtually no effect of government consumption on 
private consumption. 
12A general approach to estimating has been the excess sensitivity model proposed by Hall (1978), 
Hayashi (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990). The approach involves a random walk 
model for forward looking permanent income onsumption that is modified by  simply adding the 
current income term in the equation to capture non-forward looking behaviour. cent in Sweden and the US, to nearly 100 per cent in France. In a recent study by 
Evans and Karras (1996) the range in selected EU countries was found to be from 
25 per cent to nearly 80 per cent. 
Most of these studies neither allowed for, nor tested, the variation in the share 
of non-optimizing consumers. Bayomi and Koujianou (1989) as well as Campbell 
and Mankiw (1991) are the notable exceptions (see also Fissel and Jappelli (1990), 
and  Patterson  and  Pesaran  (1992)).  Both  Bayomi  and  Koujianou  (1989)  and 
Campbell and Mankiw (1991) investigate whether the fraction of non-optimizing 
consumers  has  changed  post  1980,  since  it  is  often  argued  that  financial 
liberalization during the 1980s has relaxed liquidity constraints in most countries 
which should show up in a fall in that fraction. Bayomi and Koujianou (1989) 
found a significant decline in the fraction of non-optimizing consumers while the 
results of  Campbell and Mankiw (1991) do not  support the idea that  liquidity 
constraints have declined in importance over time. 
The problem in both studies is that the estimated change in the fraction of rule 
of thumb consumers does not necessarily reflect changes in liquidity constraints, 
and even if it did, changes in liquidity constraints do not arise only on the part of 
financial markets but also on the part of consumers themselves (creditworthiness). 
It is possible that other factors, such as an increase in European unemployment in 
the  late  1970s  and  1980s  have  worked  to  offset  the  effects  of  financial 
deregulation on the fraction of rule of thumb consumers. It is also possible that the 
methods based on the use of dummy variables are simply not powerful enough to 
detect movements in that fraction over time. 
Rather than purely trying to detect parameter changes, some studies have tried 
to  link  variations  in  the  proportion  of  rule  of  thumb  consumers  to  various 
structural factors. In aggregate time-series studies13 Muellbauer (1982) uses the 
ratio of  current disposable income to previous consumption, while Flavin (1985) 
uses the umenployment rate as a proxy for the proportion of the population subject 
to liquidity constraints. Muellbauer (1983) did not find a strong evidence in favour 
of  liquidity constraints, while Flavin (1985) concludes that the estimated excess 
sensitivity of consumption to current income using unemployment rate as a proxy 
for the severity of liquidity constraints is large and statistically significant. More 
recently, using the UK regional data, Bayoumi (1990) looked for a special link 
with deregulation in financial markets. He estimated an excess sensitivity model in 
which the coefficient on current income was allowed to move in line with the ratio 
of consumer credit to GDP. Bayoumi found a significant negative relationship and 
concluded  that  financial  deregulation  was  associated  with  a  decrease  in  the 
proportion of rule of thumb consumers from 60 per cent in the 1970s to some 30 
per cent by 1987. 
All in  all, empirical evidence on the excess sensitivity of  consumption  to 
current  income  suggests  that  tests  on  Ricardian  equivalence  should  be 
supplemented by tests on the validity of the underlying permanent income model 
itself  before  any  conclusions  on  the  effects  of  fiscal  deficits  on  private 
consumption and aggregate demand can be made. 
131n studies using household data, Zeldes (1989) and Runkle (1991) employ low asset holdings to 
separate their samples, while Jappelli (1990) utilizes survey questions. 
12 Purpose of the paper 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of  fiscal policy on private 
consumption-saving decisions in a generalized permanent income framework with 
finite  planning horizons and government consumption as  a direct conveyer of 
utility to consumers. Finite horizons allows one to test  which of  the two main 
hypotheses - Ricardian or Keynesian - concerning the effect of fiscal deficits on 
private  consumption is  supported by  the empirical evidence.  By incorporating 
government consumption in the consumers'  utility function one is  able to test 
whether  government  consumption  and  private  consumption  are  substitutes, 
complements,  or  unrelated.  The  model  draws  on  the  works  of  Hall  (1978), 
Blanchard (1985) and Aschauer (1985). 
The model is further extended by nesting the excess sensitivity hypothesis to 
the  intertemporal optimizing framework  to  investigate whether  the  underlying 
finite horizon permanent income model is supported by the data. The extended 
model is based on the approach suggested by Hayashi (1982), and Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989). As a first step it is assumed that a constant share of disposable 
labour income accrues to non-optimizing rule of thumb consumers. In the second 
step the share of rule of thumb consumers is allowed to change over time. 
The  rest  of  the paper  is  organized as  follows.  Section 2  derives  a  finite 
horizon  permanent income consumption  function for the purpose  of  empirical 
estimation. The questions concerning the empirical implementation and method of 
estimation are discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the data and estimation 
results. Section 5 derives an extended model with rule of  thumb consumers and 
presents  the  estimation  results  obtained.  Concluding  remarks  are  drawn  in 
section 6. 
2  An intertemporal model of consumption 
behaviour 
The effect of fiscal policy on private consumption is analyzed in the framework of 
a  stochastic  intertemporal  optimization  problem  where  rational  consumers 
maximize the expected value of utility, subject to the lifetime budget constraint. 
Individual  consumers  are  assumed  to  face  exogenous  stochastic  processes  of 
disposable labour income and government consumption. The approach is similar 
to that of Aschauer (1985) in the sense that it allows individuals to derive utility 
not only from private consumption but also from public cons~mption.'~  In order to 
be able to nest the Ricardian equivalence proposition and the conventional, non- 
Ricardian  hypothesis  Aschauer's  representative  agent  model  with  an  infinite 
horizon  is  modified  by  introducing  a  finite  planning  horizon  in  line  with 
Blanchard's (1985) seminal paper. This modification introduces a wedge between 
the real rate of  return on assets and the rate at which consumers discount their 
uncertain future disposable labour income, thereby causing Ricardian equivalence 
14Eg Barro (1981) argued that a general model of consumption should include the direct effect of 
government consumption on private utility. 
13 to fail. Ricardian equivalence holds only in the case when the discount rates on 
assets and labour income coincide. 
The introduction of  finitely lived consumers in the overlapping generations 
framework means that there is no simple and realistic way to derive an aggregate 
consumption function. Exact or even approximate aggregation is impossible, if the 
economy is realistically assumed to consist of  an infinite number of  generations 
with  varying  amounts  and  compositions  of  accumulated wealth,  various  time 
horizons and different propensities to consume out of wealth.15 
Generally, the aggregation problem can be handled in two ways which both 
rely  on  a  set  of  restrictive  assumptions  that  are  needed  to  keep  the  models 
mathematically  tractable.  One  way  is  to  assume  that  there  are  only  a  few 
generations  alive  in  any  period,  so  that  it  is  simple  enough  to  compute  the 
consumption  for  each generation and  then  add them together.  The  other  way, 
suggested by Blanchard (1985) and followed in this paper, is to assume that all 
consumers  face  the  same probability  of  death  at  each  point  in  time.  Despite 
different ages and different levels of wealth, consumers have the same horizon (the 
same expected remaining lifetime) and the same propensity to consume out of 
wealth.  Due  to  this  assumption, the  economy behaves  as  if  it  had  only  one 
representative  consumer, which makes  aggregation possible despite the infinite 
number of generations. 
Blanchard's approach is flexible in the sense that the probability of death that 
measures  the finiteness of  life can be interpreted in several ways: as a horizon 
index between zero and infinity, the disconnectedness of current consumers from 
future generations, or as the myopia with which consumers foresee future taxes.16 
Modelling  households  as  if  they  had  finite  horizons  can  also be  viewed  as  a 
substitute for modelling capital market imperfections which may lead consumers 
to behave as if  they had short horizons (see Evans (1988, 1993)). Generally, by 
letting the probability of death go to zero, one gets an infinite horizon as a limiting 
case.  In  empirical  work  this  interpretational  flexibility  constitutes  clearly  a 
problem.  Another problem related to Blanchard's  approach is  that  it does  not 
capture the change in consumer behaviour over life, ie the life-cycle aspect of life. 
In this respect the formulation is closer to that of permanent income by Friedman 
(1957) than to life-cycle by Modigliani (1966), and suits better to issues where the 
finite horizon aspect is important (aggregate consumption studies) than to issues 
where differences in propensity to consume across consumers is important (cross 
section studies).17 
lSModigliani (1966) has pointed out that the relationship among wealth level, wealth composition 
and propensity to consume makes exact or approximate aggregation impossible. 
16Blanchard (1985) interpreted the  death probability  as  a measure of  the consumers'  planning 
horizon. A finite horizon in this context means that the expected lifetime is finite and  not that 
consumers are myopic.  Under Barro's  (1974) interpretation, the death probability measures the 
disconnectedness of current households from future generations. If current households treat future 
households as continuations of  themselves and  have altruistic bequest motives they behave as if 
they  had  infinite horizons (death probability is zero). In  this context positive death probability 
implies  that  current  households  feel  at  least  to  some  extent  to  be  disconnected  from  future 
generations (no bequest motive). 
171f permanent income is taken to be the annuity value of lifetime resources, the two theories are 
very close. Friedman did not, however, commit himself to this interpretation (see eg Deaton 1992). 2.1  Individual consumer18 
Consumers are assumed to adjust their consumption according to their lifetime 
resources rather than to their current income."  In  each period, each consumer is 
assumed  to  face  a  known  probability of  survival  y, which  is  assumed  to  be 
independent of  age. Probability of  surviving from period t through period t+j is 
thus yJ and the expected life of each consumer, or the horizon index in Blanchard's 
terminology, is ll(1- y).20 
Consumers  are assumed to have unrestricted  access to capital markets  at 
which they may accumulate or decumulate assets at the same constant real rate of 
return  r.  Following  Blanchard  (1985) it  is  assumed  that  there  exists  riskless 
insurance (annuity) markets, where insurance (annuity) companies make (receive) 
every  period  an  annuity  payment  to  (from)  each  consumer  holding  positive 
(negative) financial wealth, and inherit all the consumers'  wealth contingent on 
their death.21  A zero-profit condition in these markets, together with the simple 
population  structure and lifetime uncertainty, implies an  effective, risk-adjusted 
interest factor of  (l+r)ly for consumers, with (l+r) being the pure interest factor 
and lly the annuity factor. The model excludes thus all bequest motives. 
Each consumer born in period t-k  and still alive in period t is assumed to 
choose  a  consumption  strategy that  maximizes expected life-time  utility  as  of 
period t 
where ~7,~  denotes the total effective real consumption of a consumer of age k at 
time t, p is the subjective discount factor (1+6)-' with 6 the constant positive rate 
of  subjective  time  preference,  E, is  the  mathematical  expectation  operator 
conditional on information known to the consumer in period t and u(cT) is a time- 
invariant, one period utility function satisfying u' > 0 and u"  < 0. 
18Throughout the paper, uppercase letters will represent stocks or present discounted values, and 
lowercase letters will represent the corresponding flows. 
''As  Flavin (1981) points out consumers' lifetime resources can be represented in  stock form or 
flow form, the stock form being net worth, or the total expected lifetime wealth, and the flow form 
being permanent income, or the annuity value of net worth. Permanent income can then be thought 
of as the constant resource flow which, conditional of expectations in period t, can be sustained for 
the remainder of the consumer's time horizon. 
20y  = 1-p, where p is the death rate in Blanchard's (1985) model. 
An equivalent assumption to the riskless insurance companies is that there exist actuarial bonds. 
Lenders lend to intermediaries and  the claims are cancelled by  the death of  lenders. Similarly, 
borrowers borrow from intermediaries and the claims are cancelled by the death of the borrowers. 
Intermediation is thus riskless. Following Bailey (1971) the total effective consumption cT  in period t is a 
linear ~ornbination~~  of  private consumption c:  and a portion 8 of  government 
consumption g, 
A  negative value  for  OZ3 implies that  an  increase in  government consumption 
raises the marginal utility of private consumption (ie the two are complements), 
whereas a positive 8 would suggest that an increase in government consumption 
diminishes  the  marginal  utility  of  private  consumption  (ie  the  two  are 
 substitute^).^^ 
The individual consumer of age k is assumed to maximize the objective (1) 
subject to the sequence of one period flow budget constraints 
where 
22The  most commonly used specification in previous studies has been a linear function like equation 
(2) (Feldstein (1982), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Seater and Mariano (1985), Graham and 
Himarios (1991) and  Graham (1993)). An  alternative specification considered by  Bean  (1986), 
Campbell and Mankiw (1990) and Ni (1995) is the Cobb-Douglas specification. 
23A  negative 8 would force the marginal utility of government consumption to take negative values 
as well. Christian0 and Eichenbaum (1988) and Barro (1989b) have shown that a function of g, can 
be added to the utility function so that the government consumption's marginal utility becomes 
positive. Equation (I) would be modified to  (y  p)i [U(C;,,,+~)+@(~,)]  with a@/ag,  > 0. Since 
consumers  have  no  control  over  g,  the  maximization  problem  can  be  solved  ignoring  the 
government consumption's contribution to utility through the function @. 
24This  does not refer to the substitutability in the sense of  Hicks-Allen.  Instead, the Edgeworth 
criterion is used according to which private and public consumption are "net rivals" if  the marginal 
utility of one decreases as the quantity of the other increases, and "net complements" if the opposite 
holds. Let the utility function be U(c:,g,).  The substitutability between cp and g, is reflected by the 
gross second derivative U,,  If U,, < 0 (ie an increase in g, reduces the marginal utility of c:),  then cy 
and g, are Edgeworth substitutes. If U,,  > 0, they are Edgeworth complements, and if U,,  = 0, they 
are Edgeworth independent - in this case c:  and g, are separable. Under the additivity assumption 
of  private  consumption  and  government  spending  (equation  (2))  and  U(c:  +  8g,)  concave, 
U,,  < (>,=) 0 if and only if 0 > (c,=)  0.  A negative 8 corresponds to complementarity and a positive 
0  to  substitutability. According  to  Ni  (1995) the  empirical  estimates  of  the  parameter  8  are 
sensitive to the specification of total effective consumption: when specified as a linear function like 
equation (2), government spending tends to be a substitute for private consumption, whereas Cobb- 
Douglas as well as CES forms tend to imply complementarity. h,k  is period t real disposable labour income (human wealth) of a consumer 
of age k, defined as y,, s T,, - t,, 
25 
Y,k  is period t real before-tax labour income of a consumer of age k 
Tt,,  is period t real government transfers (lump-sum) received by a consumer 
of age k 
tt,k  is period t real gross tax payments (lump-sum) of a consumer of age k 
4,k  real nonlabour assets (or debt, if negative) including government bonds of 
a consumer of age k at the end of period t 
,  real assets accumulated (or debt incurred) in period t- 1 of a consumer of 
age k 
r  is a constant real rate of interest 
Gross labour income yt, government transfer payments T,, taxes t, and government 
consumption g, are assumed to be random variables and to follow given stochastic 
processes outside the control of the consumer. The specification implies, however, 
that  taxes  as  well  as  government transfers  are age-specific while  government 
consumption is not. The term (l+r)ly is the risk-adjusted gross rate of return on 
nonlabour assets (nonhuman wealth). During period t the consumer saves 
(borrows if  negative) to buy  assets and new  government bonds  and expects to 
receive  a  stream of  interest  payments on  the  accumulated assets. Government 
consumption g, enters the consumer's one period budget constraint (3) multiplied 
by 0. 
In the case of  no binding borrowing constraints the conventional solvency 
condition  is needed  to  prevent the consumer from running  a Ponzi-game  (see 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989)) where an infinite consumption and ever increasing 
debt burden is financed by new loans in each period. If the consumer is still alive 
at time t+j, then 
The no-Ponzi-game condition thus requires that the expected rate of  growth of 
assets must be less than  the risk-adjusted interest rate  (l+r)ly. Subject to  this 
solvency condition the  forward substitution in equation (3) gives the expected 
value of the lifetime budget constraint of a consumer of age k at time t in terms of 
total effective consumption 
where 
*'  Since the human wealth includes social security contributions and excludes payroll taxes, social 
security wealth is treated as part of human wealth in the consumption function. 
17 Since it is assumed that future disposable labour incomes are not known, human 
capital of a consumer of  age k at time t is the discounted sum of expected future 
disposable labour incomes E,Ht,k.26  In the same vein, E,G, denotes the discounted 
sum of expected future government consumption and E,W,,, the present value of 
expected total wealth of a consumer of age k at time t.27 
Equation  (4)  states  that  the  expected  present  value  of  total  effective 
consumption  at  time  t  equals the expected present value  of  disposable labour 
income, initial nonlabour assets q-,  and interest earned between period t- 1 and t. 
The important thing here is that the consumer is constrained only by the lifetime 
budget  constraint, so that  consumption  can be  shielded from period  to  period 
fluctuations in income through borrowing and lending. 
The term  0E,G, appears in  the  definition  of  wealth  because  according to 
Aschauer (1985) a higher level of government consumption imposes a negative 
(positive) wealth effect on the consumer if 0 < 1 (> 1). If  0 equals one, an increase 
in government consumption has one-to-one wealth effect and if 0 equals zero, a 
permanent increase in government consumption has no wealth effect. In case that 
0 is negative, an increase in government consumption will produce a wealth loss. 
The  first-order  necessary  conditions  for  the  consumer's  intertemporal 
optimization  problem  with  respect  to total  effective consumption  cT  gives  the 
Euler equations 
26By  focusing on disposable labour income instead of gross income, the impact of transfer payments 
is abstracted from the analysis. This is a valid approach if consumers perceive taxes and transfer 
payment  symmetrically in  which  case  transfer payments are  merely  negative taxes  (see  Barro 
(1974), Modigliani and  Sterling (1986,  1990)). On  arguments against this  view,  see Feldstein 
(1982), Kormendi (1982). 
"This  formulation requires that consumer behaviour exhibits certainty equivalence: the individual 
consumer chooses the path of consumption as if her future incomes and government consumption 
were  certain  to  equal  their  means.  Hence,  uncertainty  about  future  disposable  income  or 
government consumption has no impact on private consumption. The certainty equivalence arises 
when  utility  function is quadratic. With linear marginal  utility  function the marginal utility  of 
consumption  is equal to the marginal utility  of  expected consumption. In  this  case it is  as if 
expected consumption were known with certainty. Hence, only the expected values count, and not 
the variances. The sequence of Euler equations (5) characterize the relation between two adjacent 
periods  along the optimal path of  consumption: in optimum reallocation of  cT 
between two periods cannot increase utility. 
A closed-form solution for cT  can be obtained in the special case of quadratic 
utility. Although the quadratic formulation has  some serious shortcomings (see 
Zeldes (1989)) it is widely used because it delivers a linear Euler equation which 
can easily be combined with the linear budget constraint to derive a closed-form 
solution to the consumption problem: a consumption function. Following Hall 
(1978) the one-period utility function is assumed to be of the formZs 
where C is the bliss level of consumption. In this case, the Euler equation can be 
written as 
Note that equation (6) is independent of  the survival probability y (ie dynamic 
equilibrium condition of the consumer is independent of the survival probability). 
This comes from the fact that the consumer's (of age k) future utility is discounted 
at the rate (yp) whereas future values are discounted at the rate of  yl(l+r). This 
implies  that  the  intertemporal  marginal  rate  of  substitution,  IMRS,  is 
(yl(l+r))l(yP) = (P(l+r))-', which is the intertemporal relative price of period t+l 
consumption relative to that of period t. 
By assuming that r=6 and 8=0, one obtains Hall's (1978) well known random 
walk in consumption implied by the permanent income hypothesis, eg the Euler 
equation is E,c,+,  = c,. Alternatively, this can be written as c, = c,-, + e,, where E, is 
a rational forecast error, the innovation in permanent income. According to this 
formulation the optimal forecast for current consumption is the previous period's 
consumption. 
Using  the Euler equation (6) to  substitute out ~f,~,,+~  from the  consumer's 
lifetime budget constraint (4), allows to solve for the total effective consumption 
of a consumer of age k at time t 
28Unless  the utility function takes a specific form like a quadratic form, the Euler equation does not 
aggregate  across consumers. Hall  (1978) has demonstrated that if  one-period utility function is 
assumed to be a local approximation of  the consumer's  true utility function, different functional 
forms can be locally approximated by a quadratic form (see also Hayashi (1982)). A more plausible 
utility function is the constant relative risk aversion (CARA) function. Under such preferences and 
stochastic future labour income, the solution for consumer's maximization problem derived above 
is  only  an  approximation.  When  future  labour  income  uncertainty  is  high,  an  approximate 
consumption function would predict lower consumption than predicted by the certainty equivalent 
solution. where 
In terms of private consumption c:,  equation (7) can be written as 
The term in the brackets in equations (7) and (8) represents total expected wealth 
E,W,, of  a consumer of  age k still alive at time t+j and P, the constant marginal 
propensity  to  consume  out  of  that  wealth.  The  term  P,E,W,,  is  essentially  a 
generalization  of  Flavin's  (1981)  definition  of  permanent  income  to  a  finite 
horizon and utility function that encompasses also government consumption. 
2.2  Aggregate consumption 
Since  the  economy consists  of  overlapping generations, the  derivation  of  the 
aggregate consumption function requires the determination of  the size of  each 
generation and to sum across all generations. The population is normalized such 
that the initial size of each generation is one. As a fraction y of consumers in each generation survives each period, there are yk  members of the consumers of age k in 
each period. The size of the population is therefore constant29  and given by 
Aggregating  consumption  over  all  generations  and  dividing  by  the  size  of 
population yields expected per capita aggregate private consumption c: 
Similarly, expected per capita aggregate wealth in period  t can be  obtained by 
dividing the discounted sum of  expected total wealth of  all consumers from all 
generations by the total population 
where 
Aggregate per capita private consumption may now be written as a function of 
expected aggregate per capita wealth 
29The  model can easily be modified to allow for population growth by letting the birth rate exceed 
the death rate (see eg Weil(1987), Buiter (1988)). This would, however, complicate the exposition 
without adding substantially to the theoretical analysis (see Evans (1993)). By assuming a constant 
exogenous rate of population growth s, the interest rate r is replaced by (r-s)/(l+s),  the net interest 
rate, and if (1- y) is replaced by  (1- y+s)l(l+s), the rate at which disconnected households flow into 
the economy; ie, the "birth rate".  Ricardian equivalence holds if all new households are connected 
to old households; ie, if  1  -  y = s. In that case, households act as if their memberships are growing at 
the  same rate as population is growing. If  instead households act as if  their  memberships are 
growing less rapidly than population, then Blanchard's alternative to Ricardian equivalence holds. Equation (15) contrasted with equation (8) shows that the marginal propensity to 
consume out of  total wealth remains invariant across aggregation. Furthermore, 
instead of the risk-adjusted interest rate on nonlabour assets in equation (8), the 
rate  applicable in  equation (15) is  the risk-free interest rate.  The finiteness of 
individual lives results thus in a higher effective discount rate on human wealth 
than  the  rate  applied  to  nonlabour  assets.  As  the  two  types  of  wealth  are 
discounted differently when the planning horizon of  consumers is finite, ie when 
O<y<l, government deficit financing is nonneutral. 
By assuming that r = 6, y = 1 and 8 = 0, consumption function (15) reduces to 
Flavin's (198 1) infinite horizon permanent income consumption function 
where the right hand side of the equation is defined as permanent income. In this 
special case the Ricardian debt neutrality holds. 
As  shown  by  Campbell  (1987)  Flavin's  permanent  income  consumption 
function  can be  expressed in  an  alternative  form by  defining total  disposable 
income as hT  = rq-, + h, and saving st = hT  - c:.  Flavin's  permanent income 
m 
consumption function implies then that  st=-  C (1 +r)-JAhty,  ie saving takes place 
31.0 
when  current  disposable  labour  income  is  above  permanent  income  and  is 
expected to decline in the future.30  More specifically, this formulation indicates 
that under infinite planning horizon saving equals the expected discounted value 
of future declines in disposable labour income. 
Solving3' equation (15) for cy  in terms of cF-,, given the wealth constraint a, = 
h, + (l+r)q-, - cy, gives (see Appendix 1) 
30This  implies also that if disposable labour income is first-order integrated, saving is stationary and 
total income and private consumption are cointegrated. 
31~n  principle, alternative mathematically equivalent solutions of consumption functions based on 
the Euler equation approach should give the same empirical results. Himarios'  (1995) empirical 
study  shows, however,  that  this  may  not  be  the  case.  He  uses  as examples three  alternative 
solutions,  one  in  which  human  wealth  is  eliminated  (based  on  Evans  (1988)),  one  in  which 
nonhuman wealth is eliminated (based on Haque (1988)) and one which incorporates both forms of 
wealth (based on Hayashi (1982)). Despite the fact that all three expressions are mathematically 
equivalent they result in different empirical results. Himarios concludes that the reason for this is 
most likely the rnisspecification from not controlling the existence of liquidity constraints in the 
estimated  models. When this  source of  misspecification is corrected the different mathematical 
solutions yield the same empirical results with respect to consumers' planning horizon (hypothesis 
of infinite horizons is rejected) but not with respect to parameter structure. where 
Error terms E~~ = (Et-Et-l)Ht  and E,,  = (E,-Et-,)Gt  reflect the revisions of expecta- 
tions about the sequence of h,+j  and g,,  that consumers make as new information 
about future disposable income and government consumption becomes available. 
Hence, the unpredictable change in private consumption from t- 1 to t is related to 
the changes in the expected lifetime wealth (ie permanent income) warranted by 
new inf~rmation.~~ 
Equation  (16)  gives  the  expression  for  aggregate  per  capita  private 
consumption in terms of expected per capita human wealth, expected aggregate 
per  capita  wealth  accruing  from  government  consumption,  lagged  private 
consumption,  current  and  lagged  government  consumption,  and  revisions  in 
expectations.  It  nests  both  Ricardian and  non-Ricardian hypotheses  as  special 
cases. The key parameters are y and 0. With y equal to unity, forward looking 
rational consumers have infinite horizon and consider today's deficit financing as 
tomorrow's  tax liabilities. Hence, deficits have no effect on current consumption. 
Consumers base  their  consumption decisions  on  lifetime  (permanent) income, 
which depends on the present value of  government consumption but not on the 
timing of tax collections. 
The  parameter  y  less  than  unity  implies  that,  due  to  a  shorter planning 
horizon, myopia or liquidity constraints, consumers will regard their holdings of 
government bonds as net wealth. When this is the case, a current tax cut financed 
by issuing new government debt will increase expected human wealth and private 
consumption. The positive effect derived from an  intertemporal reallocation of 
taxes is due to the different discount rates: if 0 < y < 1, consumers discount taxes 
at  a  rate  yl(l+r) whereas the  future  interest  income  on  government bonds  is 
discounted at the rate l/(l+r). In other words one unit of taxes in period t+j has the 
present value (yl(l+r))i which is smaller than (l+r)-j, the present value of one unit 
of interest income on bonds. The future tax increase is thus given a smaller weight 
by finite-horizon consumers than the weight attached by them to the current tax 
cut. In the case of extreme myopia (y=O), consumers treat government bonds fully 
as a net wealth. 
A negative value for 0 implies that an increase in government consumption 
raises the marginal utility of  private consumption (ie the two are complements), 
whereas a positive 0 would suggest that an increase in government consumption 
diminishes the marginal utility of private consumption (ie the two are substitutes). 
More specifically, with y equal to unity, 0 equal to zero and 6 equal to r, 
equation  (16)  reduces  to  the  Hall's  (1978)  specification  in  which  the  current 
consumption  and  last  period's  consumption  differ  only  by  the  extent  of  the 
forecast error in current disposable income.33  The infinite horizon (y=l) and the 
32Stochastic,  or transitory, component of consumption u,, defined as zero-mean shocks to the utility 
function and measurement errors in consumption, is usually added to the error term. Flavin (198 I), 
however, justifies neglecting transitory consumption on an aggregate level provided that individual 
realizations of transitory consumption are independently distributed across the population. 
33According  to Flavin (1981) consumption would be an exact random walk only if  the transitory 
component of income were identically equal to zero. assumption of no population growth imply that there is no way for individuals to 
evade taxes by dying andlor levying taxes on other generations. 
When y < 1 and 8 + 0,  expected human wealth, government consumption and 
government debt affect current consumption over and beyond the impact of lagged 
consumption.  If  government  consumption  substitutes  perfectly  private 
consumption  (8=1), one has Feldstein's  (1982) condition for complete ex  ante 
crowding out and fiscal policy neutrality. 
Empirical implementation 
3.1  Derivation of the reduced form consumption function 
The main problem in estimating intertemporal consumption function with rational 
expectations  like equation  (16)  is  how  to handle  unobservable  future path  of 
disposable labour income  and government consumption g,.  One solution is to 
follow Hayashi's  procedure  (1982) and  to  use  stochastic  difference equations 
implied by  the rational expectations assumption to eliminate the unobservables 
from the estimation equation. The advantage of this method is that one needs not 
to specify the stochastic processes for disposable labour income and government 
cons~mption.~~  Accordingly, the following difference equations are postulated 
where  e,,  and  e,,  are  the  expectational revisions  made by  consumers  as  they 
proceed from period t- 1 to period t. Formally, 
These  surprise  terms  are,  by  construction,  orthogonal  to  the  information  set 
available  in  t- 1, I;-,,  and  thus  serially uncorrelated.  They  may,  however,  be 
34Another  approach to model the future path  of  government consumption followed by  Aschauer 
(1985) is to use an explicit forecast equation in which present and past values of government debt 
and deficit are used to signal changes in government consumption. This kind of formulation has the 
advantage that if  allows to distinguish between debt as a potential source of  wealth, which is the 
concern of the Ricardian equivalence, and debt's role as a signal of future levels of government 
consumption. correlated with  variables dated period t and contemporaneously correlated with 
each other. 
Using equations (17) to form cy - [(l+r)ly]c:-,  the unobservable variables can 
be removed from equation (16). Rearranging gives the expression for c:  in terms 
of observable variables: 
where 
3.2  Econometric issues 
Before the model can be estimated, it is necessary to address several issues of 
specification that  arise from the  nature of  aggregate time  series data used  in 
estimations. The estimation  of  equation  (18) involves  a  number  of  problems, 
which  risk  to  result  in  inconsistent  parameter  estimates.  Firstly,  the  time 
aggregation imposed on consumption function by  the use of  annual data in the 
estimations and  the  inclusion of  consumer durables in  the  measure of  private 
cons~mption~~  introduces  a  first-order  moving  average  term  into  the  lagged 
consumption expendit~re.~~  To avoid misspecification arising from time-averaging 
and durability requires the use of instruments that are lagged more than one period 
so that there is at least two period  time  gap between the instruments and the 
35See  Ch. 4 and Appendix 4 for further details on the measurement of the data. 
36Working (1960) shows that  averaging a random walk  induces  serial  correlation  between  the 
contemporaneous value  and  the first difference, but  not  earlier  lags,  making first lags invalid 
instruments. See also Campbell and Mankiw (1990) for time aggregation and Mankiw (1982) for 
durability. variables in equation (18). There may also be white-noise errors in the levels of the 
consumption  and  income  variables  due  to  'transitory  consumption'  or  to  the 
measurement  errors.  White-noise  errors  in  levels  become  first-order  moving 
average  errors  in  the  specification  and  could  be  correlated  with  once-lagged 
instruments, but not with twice-lagged instruments. 
Second problem pointed out by Hayashi (1982) is that although E,, e,,  and e,, 
are orthogonal to the information set at time t- 1, &-,,  they might not be orthogonal 
to h, and g,,~since  these variables do not belong to 4-,.  To correct for this problem 
requires  also the  use  of  instrumental variables estimator, where  at  least twice- 
lagged variables are chosen as instruments, which by definition are orthogonal to 
E,, e~,  and e,,. 
These arguments for twice-lagging the instruments imply that the error term 
in  equation (18) has a first-order moving average structure (MA(1)). If  this  is 
ignored and standard nonlinear least squares and instrumental variables procedures 
are used, the coefficient estimates remain consistent but the standard errors are 
inconsistent.  To  derive  consistent  standard  errors  in  the  presence  of  serial 
correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity in the error term Hansen's  (1982) 
GMM estimator is used. The reported standard errors are thus heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent  standard errors (White (1980)) calculated by  the 
Parzen kernel estimator. 
GMM both produces robust estimates of  the parameters and a test for the 
model  adequacy  and  the  validity  of  orthogonality conditions  implied  by  the 
rational expectations hypothesis. Hansen's (1982) overidentifying restrictions test 
(J-test) is constructed as the sample size times the minimized value of the GMM 
objective function and has  an asymptotic chi-square distribution under the null 
hypothesis of no misspecification, where the degrees of  freedom of  the limiting 
distribution is given by the number of overidentifying restrictions, ie the number 
of  orthogonality (moment)  conditions  minus  the  number  of  parameters  to  be 
estimated. 
In order for the GMM estimator to be asymptotically justifiable, all variables 
should  be  stationary. Nonstationarity  would  be  a problem  when  estimating  in 
levels,37  because it can give rise to a spurious relationship among the levels of the 
variables (see Phillips (1986)). Also the parameter estimates from a regression of 
one such variable on others are inconsistent and may not even be convergent. To 
account for the nonstationarity a possible solution would be to follow Campbell 
and Deaton (1989) and to divide all variables by the lagged level of income, h,-, to 
obtain stationarity or to estimate equation (18) in the first difference form. The 
problem in transforming the equation into difference form is that lagged values of 
Act as instruments do not explain a large fraction of  the variance of  Act, if the 
univariate time series process for c, is close to a random walk. 
These  transformations  are,  however,  not  needed,  if  the  variables  are 
cointegrated. Recent results by West (1988) and Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) 
37Flavin  (1981, 1985), Hayashi (1982), and others generally specify the permanent income model 
with  variables in  levels and  then  remove  a deterministic time  trend  from the  data  to  achieve 
stationarity of the variables. Mankiw and Shapiro (1985), however, show that such detrending can 
lead to spurious excess sensitivity of consumption to income innovations. On the other hand, Stock 
and West (1988) show that the spurious sensitivity is not due to spurious cycles but rather to the 
shift in the asymptotic distribution when a deterministic trend is included. show  that  inference  and  estimation  may  proceed  in  the  standard way  and no 
special  steps  to  handle  the  nonstationarity  is  necessary,  if  the  nonstationary 
regressors are cointegrated and the unconditional mean of their first differences is 
non-zero. The underlying theory clearly suggests that there should be a stable long 
run  relationship among the levelis  of  variables in equation (18), and the  set of 
variables used in the empirical estimation should be cointegrated. It is shown in 
the Appendix 3 that the conditions required for estimating in levels are fulfilled for 
equation (1  8). 
Since  the  equation  (18)  is  nonlinear  only  in  its  parameters, it  could  be 
estimated  as  an  unrestricted  linear  model.  One  could  then  test  whether  the 
estimated  composite  coefficients  have  the  probability  limits  implied  by  the 
Ricardian  equivalence.  However,  given  that  the  model  is  overidentified,  the 
underlying parameters cannot be recovered. By using a nonlinear estimator one 
can  get  direct  estimates  of  the  parameters  in  question  that  will  give  a  more 
meaningful measure of any rejection that might occur. 
Description of the data and estimation results 
In the study of intertemporal consumption behaviour, it is important to distinguish 
between  consumption  and  consumer  expenditure.  At  any  point  in  time  the 
consumption of previously purchased durable goods yield utility without inducing 
any  consumer  spending. Likewise,  the  utility  derived  from  current  consumer 
expenditure on durable goods is not restricted to the time of  purchase, but may 
extend to several periods. Ideally, consumption of durable goods should therefore 
be measured in terms of  service flow these goods render to the consumer during 
several periods and not in terms of current expenditures. Despite the efforts made 
to compute the imputed services from durable goods, no reliable method exists so 
far.38 
Due to the arbitrariness and difficulties involved in the imputation of a service 
flow from the stock of consumer durables, the permanent-income hypothesis and 
Ricardian  equivalence  has  generally  been  tested  by  using  consumption 
expenditures on services and nondurable goods as a relevant measure for private 
cons~mption.~~  However, since the measure excluding consumption expenditures 
on  durables  and  semidurables  excludes  also  services  rendered  by  previously 
acquired durable goods, it is no longer strictly valid to estimate the consumption 
function along with the budget constraint. The usual procedure to account for this 
imbalance is to rescale the data by netting durables out of the income measure. 
Rescaling of the data does not, however, solve the basic problem involved in 
this procedure. It  requires that the components making up  real expenditure  on 
nondurable goods and services have constant relative prices so that they can be 
38A  number of studies have used the consumption data based on the computation method developed 
by  Christensen and  Jorgenson  (1973) for the US  data (eg Hayashi  (1982), Kormendi  (1983), 
Graham  and  Himarios  (1991)). For  a discussion of  a potential problem  with  Christensen and 
Jorgenson's imputed service flow, see Cushing (1992). 
39~ee  eg Aschauer (198%  Evans (1988), Evans and Hasan (1994), Graham and Himarios (19961, 
Haug (1990), Himarios (1995). treated as a Hicks composite commodity and that the momentary utility function is 
separable between this composite commodity and the service flow from durable 
goods. There is, however, substantial evidence against this  assumption (see eg 
Eichenbaum  and  Hansen  (1990), Deaton  (1992)).  When  this  is  the  case  the 
practice  of  testing  quadratic  models  of  aggregate consumption  using  data  on 
nondurables and services only can be called into question. 
Moreover, when the primary interest is in the effects of fiscal policy variables 
on private consumption, the exclusion of consumer durables from the consumption 
measure  could  seriously  bias  the  results  in  favour  of  Ricardian  equivalence 
hypothesis,  since purchases of  durables are often considered more  sensitive to 
income  or  wealth  changes  than  are  nondurables.  Although  the  total  private 
consumption  expenditure  is  not  in  line  with  the  underlying  model  of  utility 
ma~imization,"~  it is considered to be a better measure for private consumption 
than those excluding durable goods altogether or those using computed values of 
the service 
The appropriate definition of  labour income is not without problems either. 
Eg Flavin  (1981) and Bernanke (1985) suggest that it may be preferable to use 
total  personal  income  since  innovations  in  this  measure  reflect  unanticipated 
capital gains better than other more narrowly defined income measures like wage 
income. The theoretical model, however, suggests using some measure of  non- 
property  income,  that  includes employers'  contributions to  social security and 
pension funds and excludes items like rent, dividends, and interest receipts. 
When  measuring  the  government  consumption  the  distinction  between 
government  spending on goods and services that provides utility to the private 
consumers  in the  current period  and  that  yielding utility in  future periods  via 
government investment would potentially be important (see Kormendi (1983) on 
that  and  further  aspects).  However,  the  problems  arising  from  the  correct 
measurement of durability are the same here as in private consumption. Another 
problem  arises  from  the  heterogeneity  of  government  consumption:  albeit 
consumers may perceive some components of government consumption as close 
substitutes  for  private  consumption,  some  items  might  be  perceived  as 
complements,  and  some  as  unrelated.  This  suggests  that  the  measure  of 
government consumption should not treat all expenditures as a one homogenous 
group. A rough way to correct the measure of  government consumption due to 
heterogeneity  of  its  components  is  to  exclude  national  defence  expenditures 
(Kormendi (1983), Evans and Karras (1996)). This is not, however, possible in the 
present study due to the lack of data. Consequently, the conventional practice to 
40Since  an intertemporally separate utility function means that the marginal rate of  substitution 
between any two periods is independent of the level of consumption in any other period, it does not 
allow for goods whose effects last over time. It is not, however, clear on theoretical grounds that the 
separability assumption is seriously misleading for an aggregate of commodities (real consumption) 
with preferences defined over the quarterly or annual frequencies that are usual in empirical work 
(see Deaton (1992)). 
41Total  private final consumption expenditure is used by Haque (1988) and Evans (1993). Campbell 
and Mankiw (1990) used  both total consumption expenditures and  expenditures on nondurables 
and services. No inferences were affected by the choice of the consumption measure. In Graham 
and Himarios (1991), however, the choice of the consumption measure proved to be critical to the 
rejection  or  nonrejection  of  some  hypotheses  tested.  On  the  importance  of  the  choice  of 
consumption measure for Kormendi's (1983) results, see Graham (1992). use  total  government expenditure without  differentiating between consumption 
and nonconsumption measures or durability is followed here. This might bias the 
coefficient on government consumption downward. 
No attempt is made to distinguish temporary changes in fiscal policy variables 
from permanent changes. In principle this could be an important issue, since under 
rational expectations only permanent changes in fiscal policy variables can affect 
consumption due to changes in permanent income. Changes that are known to be 
transitory cannot influence private consumption. In practice, the classification of 
changes in fiscal variables as unambiguously temporary or permanent is virtually 
impossible. 
4.1  Data 
The annual time series data are from the OECD National Accounts and the sample 
consists ten EU countries listed in Table 1. The criterion for including a country 
was the availability of at least thirty observations for the actual estimation period 
given  that  some  observations  are  lost  due  to  the  use  of  lagged  instruments. 
Detailed description of the data is given in the Appendix 4. 
Table 1.  Countries is the sample and estimation period 
Country  Estimation period 
Austria  1963- 1994 
Belgium  1964- 1994 
Finland  1963- 1995 
France  1964- 1993 
Germany  1963- 1993 
Greece  1964- 1994 
Italy  1964- 1  994 
Netherlands  1965- 1994 
Sweden  1964- 1994 
UK  1963- 1994 
Private  consumption  cy  is  measured  by  per  capita  total  private  consumption 
expenditures at constant prices, disposable labour income h, is measured by per 
capita total personal  income less per  capita household  income taxes  and other 
direct taxes for Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK and by per 
capita non-property income plus  government transfer  payments less  household 
income  taxes  and  other  direct  taxes  for  Austria,  Belgium,  Greece  and  the 
Netherlands. The income measure for a country is chosen on the ground of prior 
examination  of  the  time  series  properties  of  the  data  and  data  availability. 
Government  consumption  g,  is  measured  by  general  government  final 
consumption expenditures per capita at constant prices. 
The  instrument  set  consists  of  the  second  and  third  lag  of  total  private 
consumption,  disposable  labour  income  and  government  consumption.  All instruments are measured in  per  capita terms.42  In  addition a dummy variable 
D91-93  is  included  in the regressions concerning Finland  on the  ground that 
during  these  years  the  Finnish  economy was  hit  by  an  unexceptionally  deep 
recession and severe banking ~risis.~'  The inclusion of this dummy is supported by 
prior examination of the data and it leads also to a more satisfactory performance 
of the estimated model. The use of a dummy in this way is of course open to the 
objection of data mining. 
The real interest rate was fixed to 3 % pa. in the  estimation^.^^ All data not 
already valued at constant prices are deflated by the price deflator implied by the 
ratio of nominal total private consumption expenditures to those valued at constant 
prices. 
4.2  Estimation results 
Deviations from Ricardian neutrality have generally been explained by  different 
planning  horizons  of  the  government and private  sector. As  suggested by  the 
theoretical framework the effects of  government financing decisions on private 
consumption depend crucially on the estimated parameter value of  y, eg on the 
length of average horizon for private consumption and saving decisions, 141- y). 
Estimated  parameter values for y less than  unity  results  in  a  shorter planning 
horizon for the private sector and hence, in fiscal policy nonneutrality. The 
unrestricted version of the consumption equation is estimated first and then theory- 
generated restrictions on y and 0 are tested using the Wald test.45 
Table  2 presents  the  country-specific estimates of  P,,  y  and  0  with  their 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors over the sample 
periods given in Table 1. Estimations were performed assuming r = 8, which is a 
common assumption in empirical studies based on permanent income hypothesis. 
421t  is important to note that there are several possible instrumental variables that can be used in the 
GMM estimation. Ideally, one should derive an efficiency bound  for the asymptotic covariance 
matrices of the GMM estimators and optimal instruments that achieve a lower bound. Instead of 
this  a number of  experiments were  undertaken with  several instrument sets. The results  were, 
however, less satisfactory than those based on the chosen instrument sets. In general, the results do 
not appear to be significantly affected by the choice of instruments. However, some results proved 
to be to some extent sensitive to the number of  lags included in  the sense that  the higher  the 
number of lags, the more efficient the estimates. 
430n  the effects of  banking crisis on private consumption and  saving in Finland, see Brunila and 
Takala (1993). 
44The  variability of the real interest rate has, however, been  quite substantial during the sample 
period. It should also be noted that the real interest rate was very low and even negative in several 
countries in the sample in the 1970s. 
45~he  hypotheses to be tested are written as h(b)=O, where b is the vector of parameters of  the 
unconstrained model and h(b) is a set of m nonlinear constraints on those parameters. Given a set of 
estimates b and the associated covariance estimate V(b), the constraints h(b) and their covariance 
matrix (all evaluated at the estimated b vector) is computed as:V(h(b)) = (dhldb)' V(b) (dh/db). 
From h(b) and its variance a test statistic is formed T = h(b) V(h(b))-' (h(b))'. This test statistic is 
distributed asymptotically as a  x2  variable with  degrees of  freedom equal to m under  the null 
hypothesis (when the constraints hold). Due to this assumption the constant term  in equation (18) drops out and the 
parameter measuring the propensity to consume out of total expected wealth, P, 
equals  (l+r-y)l(l+r).  This  assumption is also justified  by  the  data,  since  the 
restriction  = 0 could not be rejected by the Wald test at conventional levels of 
significance for any of the countries in the sample. 
Table 2.  GMM estimation of equation (18) for selected EU 
countries46 
Austria 
Unrestricted  .450  .946  -2.391  0.714 
(. 242)  (.042)  (1.379) 
Restrictions 
y=l  -  .028  -  6.049  0.914  1.659 
(. 164)  (4.859)  (0.198) 
0=0  .410  .962  0.294  3.006 
(. 199)  (.028)  (0.083) 
y=1,8=0  .241  0.270  3.008 
(-226)  (0.222) 
Belgium 
Unrestricted  .063 
(.536) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .263 
(.214) 
0=0  .275 
(.  183) 
y=1,0=0  .292' 
(. 188) 
Finland 
Unrestricted  .674 
(.070) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .613 
(.063) 
0=0  1.030 
(. 172) 
y=1,0=0  .970 
(.  146) 
46Due  to somewhat inconclusive results of the unit root tests the equation was estimated also using 
transformed  variables  suggested  by  Campbell  and  Deaton  (1989). The conclusions  remained 
roughly the  same, the  major  differences being  in  the  efficiency of  estimates.  The transformed 
variables tend to produce more efficient estimates than those obtained in the level form. Table 2 (continued) 
I3  Y  0  P-value  Wald-test 
France 
Unrestricted  .560  .989  .088  0.170 
(.229)  (.018)  (1.893) 
Restrictions 
y=1  -.I24  2.003  0.348  0.329 
(.  196)  (2.129)  (0.566) 
0=0  .566  .990  0.293  0.002 
(.220)  (.011)  (0.963) 
y=1,0=0  .473  0.374  0.708 
(.  153)  (0.702) 
Germany 
Unrestricted  .507 
(.323) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .476 
(.212) 
0=0  .667 
(.178) 
y=1,0=0  .654 
(. 167) 
Greece 
Unrestricted  .876 
(.  3  27) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .880 
(.313) 
8=0  .I82 
(. 150) 
y=1,0=0  .I32 
(. 160) 
Italy 
Unrestricted  .673  1.015  2.740  0.258 
(. 156)  (.012)  (2.349) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .615  3.306  0.260  1.445 
(.138)  (2.258)  (0.229) 
0=0  .686  1.028  0.258  1.360 
(. 149)  (.010)  (0.243) 
y=1,0=0  .448  0.108  4.760 
(. 150)  (0.092) Table 2 (continued) 
- 
I3  Y  0  P-value  Wald-test 
Netherlands 
Unrestricted  .755  .939  - 1.982  0.556 
(.175)  (.021)  (.507) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .546  -  1.805  0.473  8.396 
(. 104)  (.571)  (0.004) 
0=0  .609  .953  0.331  15.293 
(. 133)  (.029)  (0.000) 
y=1,0=0  .474  0.402  22.557 
(.089)  (0.000) 
Sweden 
Unrestricted  .677 
(.353) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .043 
(. 186) 
8=0  .520 
(.287) 
y=1,0=0  .022 
(. 1  83) 
UK 
Unrestricted  .724  .778  7.494  0.913 
(.730)  (.log)  (10.274) 
Restrictions 
y=l  .064  8.342  0.93  1  4.173 
(.141)  (5.120)  (0.041) 
0=O  .452  1.055  0.457  0.532 
(.272)  (.  102)  (0.466) 
y=1,0=0  .649  0.460  13.036 
(. 140)  (0.001) 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. P-value 
is the significance level of the validity of overidentifying restrictions (J-test). The Wald-test is for 
the validity of the imposed restriction with its significance level in parentheses. The instruments for 
the  unrestricted  and  restricted  specifications  include  the  second  and  third  lag  of  private 
consumption,  government consumption  and  disposable  labour income. Detailed description  of 
country-specific differences in the lag structure of instuments is given in Appendix 4. 
The probability  value associated with the  orhogonality constraints (P-value)  is 
shown in the fourth column in Table 2. The general conclusion to be drawn is that 
the  model performs satisfactorily for all  countries: tests  of  the overidentifying 
restrictions do not reject the model while the estimates of y and 0 as well as their 
stanrdard errors are not overly sensitive to various specifications. Specifically, the 
estimates of  y turn out to be statistically significant and of the expected sign and 
magnitude for all countries whereas the parameter value for 0 remains unidentified 
for most of the countries in the sample. The main anomaly pertains to the results for  p,,  where  the  coefficient is  almost  invariably  too  high  given  the  overall 
parameter structure. 
The unrestricted estimate of  y proves to be close to unity and statistically 
significant  at  1 per  cent level for Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Italy. 
Moreover, the hypothesis of an infinite planning horizon (y=l) cannot be rejected 
for these countries at conventional levels of  significance. For Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK  the estimate of  y proves to be somewhat 
lower, varying in the range of  .78 to .94. The restriction y=l is rejected at 5 per 
cent significance level for the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, while for Finland 
it can be rejected only at 10 per cent significance level. Finally, for Belgium the 
restriction cannot be rejected by the Wald test. The results seem thus to give some 
support for the Ricardian neutrality hypothesis and infinite planning horizon as a 
valid approximation of the consumes behaviour in six out of ten EU countries in 
the sample. This suggests that consumers in these six countries are sufficiently 
Ricardian in their behaviour to increase their saving one-to-one with increases in 
the government deficit financing whereas in the remaining four countries a part of 
the  government  debt  accumulation is  treated  as  net  wealth and hence, private 
saving increases less than one-to-one with increases in the budget deficit. 
Under the restriction 8=0 the values of .g appear to be broadly consistent with 
the unrestricted ones. In the case of Belgium, Finland and the UK the imposition 
of this restriction results in an increased value of y. 
The unrestricted estimate of P, turns out to be excessively high in all but one 
country. An infinite planning horizon implied by the estimated values of y or even 
a planning horizon of approximately sixteen years as in the case of Sweden and the 
Netherlands renders the values of P, economically ~nplausible.~~  This anomalious 
result might be due to measurement errors in consumption and disposable labour 
income  and  more  importantly,  due  to  liquidity   constraint^^^  that  decrease 
consumers'  ability  for  intertemporal  consumption  smoothing  and  make 
consumption excessively sensitive to current income to conform the predictions of 
intertemporal  optimization (see Flavin (1981)).49  Under the restriction y=l the 
estimates of p, tend to decrease slightly in some countries or get the wrong sign 
and become statistically insignificant. The values of P, seem also to be sensitive to 
the restriction imposed on 8. 
The parameter estimates of 8 are not statistically different from zero for most 
of the countries suggesting that government consumption and private consumption 
47The  estimated value of  y  .94 for Sweden implies a planning horizon of  roughly sixteen years 
whereas the value of p around .68 implies a planning horizon of only one and a half years! 
48Under  potentially binding liquidity constraints, the underlying Euler equation does not hold since 
some consumers who would like to borrow at the given interest rate but are prevented from doing 
so consume relatively less in period t and relatively more in period t+l than in  the absence of 
liquidity constraints. 
49The  anomalious result may be partly due to the mathematical solution in which nonlabour wealth 
is eliminated from the estimation equation (see Appendix 1). Some support to this can be found in 
Himarios's  (1995) comparative sudy where the estimated value of the parameter P, is in line with 
the values reported here when  using a consumption function based  on an equivalent mathetical 
solution. When estimations were based on solutions including nonlabour wealth as a right hand 
variable, the values of P, dropped significantly and were, in general, consistent with those obtained 
for the parameter y. See note (3  1) in page 22. tend  to  be  unrelated. In  fact,  the  unrestricted  estimate  of  8  turn  out  to  be 
statistically significant only for Greece and the Netherlands at conventional levels 
of significance. At  10 per cent significance level it is statistically significant also 
for  Austria,  Finland  and  Germany.  For  Austria,  Germany,  Greece  and  the 
Netherlands 8 is negative implying that government consumption is a complement 
to private consumption whereas for Finland 8 turns out to be positive indicating 
substitutability instead of complementarity. The restriction 8=0 is rejected by the 
Wald test at 5 per cent significance level for Greece and the Netherlands and at 10 
per cent level for Austria, Finland and Germany. 
Finally, the joint  restriction, y=l and 8=0, cannot be rejected at 5 per cent 
significance  level  for  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany  and  Italy 
whereas it is strongly rejected for Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
The consumption model for the first group of countries is thus in line with Flavin's 
(1981)  infinite  horizon  permanent  income  model,  the  major  empirical 
inconsistency being excessively high values for PI in these countries. 
4.3  Panel estimation results 
Since  empirical  results  for  individual  countries  may  suffer  from  various 
econometric shortcoming due to relatively short sample periods, the data is used as 
a panel for the ten EU countries in the sample. Specifically, country-specific panel 
data provide several benefits for econometric estimation since the data contain 
information  with  regard  to  intercountry  differences  in  private  consumption 
behaviour as well as its time variation in each country. The general structure of the 
estimated fixed effect or within model can be written as 
t=1,  ...,  Ti and i=1,  ...,  N. 
where cTt denotes aggregate per capita private consumption in country i at time t, 
a, and ai  are parameters, XI,  is a vector of variables including the interest rate and 
predetermined variables for country i at time t, and E,  is the error term. 
The estimates  are obtained by  allowing a fixed effect for each country, ie 
allowing  a different intercept for each country regression. The parameter  a,,  = 
a, + a,  is the intercept of  the i"  country, where a, is the mean intercept and ai 
represents  the unobservable country-specific effect calculated  as the  difference 
from the mean  for the i"  country. The hypothesis that  the intercepts  are aqua1 
across the countries is then tested by the Wald-test. 
To obtain asymptotically efficient estimates of  panel data without imposing 
either conditional homoscedasticity or independence over time on the disturbances 
of the model, the GMM estimator proposed by Hansen and Singleton (1982)50  is 
used. Since the estimation period differs across countries the panel is unbalanced. 
The use of unbalanced panel data gives 3 14 observations. 
The panel estimations were run using three different measures for disposable 
labour income to check the robustness of results with respect to income variable. 
''See  also Arellano and Bond (1991). The first line in Table 3 gives the unrestricted panel estimates of PI, y and 8 with 
their autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors using  the 
same  disposable  income  measure  as  in  the  country-specific estimations  (see 
Chapter 4.1). The results reported in the second line are from estimations where 
disposable income is measured by total personal income less household income 
taxes and other direct taxes for all countries except Greece and the Netherlands 
where data on total personal income was not a~ailable.~'  The third line gives the 
results  using  non-property  income  plus  government  transfer  payments  less 
household  income taxes and other direct taxes as a measure of  income for all 
countries in the  sample. A fixed real  interest rate of  3 per cent is used  in  all 
estimations. 
As shown in the table the panel estimation results are broadly in line with the 
conclusions made on the basis of separate country-specific estimations. The results 
prove  also  to  be  robust  with  respect  to  various  measures  of  income.  The 
unrestricted estimate of y turns out to be close to unity and statistically significant 
at  1 per  cent level. As expected, the restriction  y=l cannot be rejected by the 
Wald-test. 
Table 3.  GMM estimation of equation (18) using a panel of 
10  EU-countries 
Unrestricted estimates  Wald-test 
I3  Y  8  P-value  y=l  0=0  y=l  Equal 
0=O  intercepts 
r=0.03 
Country-  ,449  .996  -1.234  0.988  0.266  7.529  8.799  3.596 
specific  (. 105)  (.007)  (.450)  (0.606)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.936) 
Total income  .465  .998  -1.171  0.862  0.180  10.543  21.333  11.221 
(.  110)  (.005)  (.361)  (0.671)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.261) 
Non-property  .314  1.010  - 1.044  0.638  0.632  2.654  4.077  6.272 
income  (.113)  (-012)  (.641)  (0.427)  (0.103)  (0.130)  (0.712) 
r=0.05 
Country-  .223  1.007  -2.297  0.779  0.158  22.840  23.030  8.315 
specific  (.115)  (.017)  (.481)  (0.69  1)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.503) 
Totalincome  .209  1.008  -2.365  0.438  0.302  20.865  20.873  11.942 
(.115)  (.014)  (.518)  (0.582)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.216) 
Non-property  .I94  1.028  -2.1 10  0.827  1.090  37.455  61.164  7.294 
income  (. 127)  (.027)  (.345)  (0.296)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.505) 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. P-value 
is the significance level of the validity of overidentifying restrictions (J-test). The Wald-test is for 
the validity of the imposed restrictions with its significance level in parentheses. The instruments 
for  the  unrestricted  and  restricted  specifications include  the  second  and  third  lag  of  private 
consumption, government consumption, disposable labour income and nine country-dummies. 
"For  these two countries non-property income plus government transfer payments was used instead 
of  total personal income. The unrestricted estimate of  0 is negative and statistically significant indicating 
that private consumption and government consumption are rather complements 
than  substitutes. This result is  well in  line with the  ones found in two recent 
studies by Karras (1994) and Evans and Karras (1996). The restriction 8=0 and the 
joint  hypothesis,  y=l  and  0=0,  are  rejected  by  the  Wald-test  at  1 per  cent 
significance level when  using the first two income variables. When  income is 
measured by non-property income, ie excluding rent, dividens and interest income, 
the restrictions cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. 
The unobservable country-specific effects (not reported in the table) proved to 
be statistically unsignificant for each country. As expected, the hypothesis that the 
intercepts are equal across the countries cannot be rejected by the Wald-test. 
To  check the robustness of  the results with respect to the interest rate the 
panel estimation is also run using a given real interest rate of  5 per cent. The 
fourth, fifth and sixth lines in Table 3 give the estimates of P,, y and 8 under the 
assumption of a 5 per cent real interest rate. The estimate of y proves to be robust 
whereas the values of p, and 8 are found to be somewhat sensitive to the interest 
rate  applied. The interest rate  sensitivity of  /3,  is obvious  from the theoretical 
model,  where  P,  is  equal  to  (l+r-y)l(l+r)  when  the  subjective  rate  of  time 
preference, 6, is assumed to be equal to the real rate of interest r. According to the 
results  p,  decreases  with  the  increases  in  the  interest  rate.  With  y  virtually 
unchanged this is, however, unplausible and in fact, exactly the opposite to what 
one would expect. For lack of better explanations this contradictory result is likely 
to arise due to the problems associated with the estimation of P, in general. 
As  regards the  parameter  0, its absolute value and  statistical  significance 
increase with the increases in the real interest rate making the complementarity of 
government consumption  and private consumption stronger in both  cases. The 
interest rate sensitivity of the parameter 0 was reported also in the recent study by 
Ni (1995). He noted that due to the fact that government consumption is relatively 
small compared to private consumption the GMM estimates of 8 might become 
sensitive to the measurement of  interest rates. Finally, the rejection 0=0 and the 
joint rejection, y =  1 and 8=0, are strongly rejected by the Wald-test irrespective of 
the income measure used. 
So far, it has been assumed that the GMM estimates are structurally stable 
over the sample period. This assumption is required the for asymptotic properties 
of  the  GMM  estimates  to  hold  and  the  Hansen's  J-test  to  remain  valid 
asymptotically.  Structural  instability  over  the  sample  period  will  invalidate 
conventional significance test and can yield  misleading parameter estimates. A 
potential  candidate causing  structural instability would be the  financial market 
liberalization that took place in the majority of countries included in the sample 
during  the  1980s.  The  major  implication  of  this  with  respect  to  private 
consumption  is that  by  improving the borrowing possibilities  of  consumers  it 
should  also  improve  the  possibility  for  intertemporal  consumption  smoothing 
inherent in the underlying theoretical model compared to the situation in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Table 4.  GMM estimation of equation (18) using a panel of 
10 EU-countries for the subperiod starting from the 
mid 1970s 
Unrestricted estimates  Wald-test 
63  8  P-value  y=l  8=0  y=l  Equal 
8=0  intercepts 
r = 0.03 
Country-  ,383  1.002  -  1.644  0.999  0.079  11.246  11.497  11.438 
specific  (. 1  19)  (.009)  (.490)  (0.779)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.247) 
Total income  .410  1.007  -  1.799  0.784  0.938  15.252  15.275  23.25 1 
(. 115)  (.007)  (-461)  (0.333)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
Non-property  .284  1.017  -  1.356  0.892  1.198  9.799  15.196  12.074 
income  (. 127)  (.016)  (.433)  (0.274)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.209) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
In  order to investigate the  stability of  parameters the consumption equation  is 
estimated for the period starting from the mid  1970s. The resulting subsample 
consists  of  194 observations  and  the  results  are presented in  Table  4.  When 
comparing the results obtained from the subsample to those of the total sample 
with 3 per cent interest rate (Table 3), the obvious conclusion is that the parameter 
estimates seem not to be overly sensitive to the estimation period. In  fact, the 
results are remarkably similar suggesting that structural instability does not pose 
any serious problems for the validity of results. It should, however, be noted that 
the hypothesis of equal intercepts is rejected by the Wald-test in two out of three 
cases depending on the income variable used. This result is entirely due to the 
Finnish  data  since  the  unobservable country-effect (not  reported in  the  table) 
proved to be statistically significant only for Finland. The apparent explanation for 
this is the severe recession hit by the economy in the 1990s, the effect of which 
was  controlled  by  a  dummy-variable in  the  country-specific  estimations  (see 
Chapter 4.1). 
The excess sensitivity hypothesis 
The  empirical  evidence  on  the  Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis presented  in 
Chapter  4.2 proved to be  inconclusive due to the inconsistencies found in the 
parameter structure. On the one hand, the results from the country-specific as well 
as panel estimations seem to give a strong support for an infinite planning horizon 
on  the part of  consumers, and thus for Ricardian debt neutrality.  On the other 
hand, the excessively high propensity to consume out of total expected wealth 
found in the estimations is not compatible with an infinite horizon, but in fact, 
itself suggests a rather short one. The existence of liquidity constraintss2  would provide a tempting explanation 
for the unplausibly high estimates for the propensity to consume out of wealth due 
to the well known fact that if capital market imperfections prevent consumers from 
borrowing  to  smooth  consumption  over  transitory  fluctuations  in  income 
consumption  becomes  constrained  by  current  income.  In  this  case  actual 
consumption and transitory income will be positively correlated and the marginal 
propensity to consume out of  transitory income will be positive instead of being 
zero. Only when consumers have free access to capital markets the maximization 
of  lifetime  utility  subject to  an  overall lifetime budget  constraint leads  to  the 
independence  of  current  consumption  from  transitory  fluctuations  in  current 
income.  Liquidity  constraints  by  preventing  the  consumer  from  realizing  her 
desired (optimal) consumption plan can, therefore, cause private consumption to 
be too sensitive to current income to conform the predictions of the intertemporal 
optimizing  framework  even  if  consumers  were  rational  and  forward-looking. 
Thus,  if  the  assumption  of  perfect  capital  markets  is  violated,  empirical 
consumption  functions  derived  from  the  forward-looking  permanent  income 
models  are likely to  suffer from misspecification problems  and  specificly, the 
omission  of  liquidity  constraints  can  bias  the  estimate  of  the  propensity  to 
consume out of wealth upwards. This implies that before making any far-reaching 
conclusions about the validity of  Ricardian equivalence and its economic policy 
implications the finite horizon permanent income model derived in Chapter 2.1 
has  to  be  extended  to  incorporate  also  the  effects  of  current  income  on 
consumption. One can then test, whether the underlying permanent income model 
is supported by the data. 
5.1  Modeling liquidity constraints or the excess sensitivity 
of demand? 
Since Flavin (1981,  1985)53  there has emerged a large body of empirical studies 
based on aggregate time series data that give strong support to the hypothesis that 
consumption is more sensitive to current income than warranted by the forward 
looking rational expectations-permanent income hypothesis. Although there are 
52A  variety of  forms of liquidity constraints have been examined in the literature, each of which 
involves some price and/or quantity restrictions on the borrowing. Borrowing constraints can arise 
when  individuals have private information about their future labour income or riskiness of  the 
project to be financed. The resulting adverse selection and/or moral hazard problems can lead to 
credit rationing, a market failure that would not arise under perfect information (see Stiglitz and 
Weiss  (1981)). According  to  Hayashi (1985) the most  widely  accepted  definition of  liquidity 
constraints is that consumers are said to be liquidity constrained if they face quantity constraints on 
the amount of borrowing (credit rationing) or if  the loan rates available to them are higher that the 
rate at which they could lend (differential rates). 
53Flavin  (1985) asks if the excess sensitivity of consumption to current income is due to liquidity 
constraints or myopia in the sense that the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income 
is non-zero. Flavin concludes that the findings indicate that a simple consumption function with 
non-zero  marginal propensity to consume out of  transitory  income is an  incomplete model  and 
suggests  that  liquidity  constraints  rather  than  myopic  behaviour  explain  the  observed  excess 
sensitivity of consumption to current income. several reasons that make the interpretation of the results rather problematic, the 
general conclusion has been that the found excess sensitivity can be regarded as 
evidence on the existence of liquidity constraints (see Jappelli and Pagano (1989), 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989)). This interpretation can be called in question first 
of all due to the fact that empirical estimations refered to are not based on well- 
specified  theoretical  models  incorporating  liquidity  constraints,  Instead  the 
standard approach in the context of aggregate data has been the one suggested by 
Hall (1978), Hayashi (1982), and Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990)54  where the 
excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in income is accounted 
for by a constant fraction of the population behaving as Keynesian non-optimizing 
rule of thumb con~urners.~~  This simple Keynesian consumption function is then 
nested  to  the  forward-looking  permanent  income  model  (Euler-equation)  by 
assuming that aggregate per capita consumption is equal to a weighted average of 
the two types of  consumers, with weights  A  and  1-A.  The parameter A  is then 
interpreted  as  the  fraction  of  income  accruing  from  liquidity  constrained 
consumers  and  1-A  as  the  fraction  accruing from  forward-looking permanent 
income  consumers.  To  be  specific,  the  interpretation  should rather  be  that  A 
denotes  the  degree  of  excess  sensitivity  of  consumption  to  current  income 
compared to the case where every consumer behaves according to the forward- 
looking permanent income hypothesis. 
If the consumption equation characterizing the behaviour of the rule of thumb 
consumers is attributed to liquidity constraints, one must assume that there are 
both borrowing and lending constraints that are binding in every period,56  which is 
not  a  very  palusible  assumption.  If  only  borrowing  constraint  is  assumed, 
individuals must be choosing never to save. This means that individuals must want 
to consume more than what they earn and must have run down their net asset 
positions. However, under rational behaviour, there is no general presumption that 
liquidity  constrained  consumers  consume  all  their  current  disposable  labour 
income  and  that  an  increase in  this  income  would  be  entirely reflected  in  an 
increase  in  consumption. As  individuals  generally receive  both  good  and bad 
draws of income, they will choose to save in good times to avoid declines in the 
consumption during bad times. Instead of being liquidity constrained the simple 
Keynesian behaviour followed by the rule of thumb consumers may be justified by 
myopia in which case consumers do not take into account the future consequences 
of current fiscal policy. 
54This  has been adopted as a standard approach to incorporate liquidity constraints in the models 
testing Ricardian equivalence in  the context of  the permanent income hypothesis, see Cushing 
(1992), Heijdra and van Dalen (1996), Himarios (1995), Leiderman and Razin (1988), Evans and 
Karras (1996). 
''Rule  of thumb consumers are assumed to have no assets nor access to the capital markets and the 
best they can do is to consume all their disposable income. This rule of thumb or simple Keynesian 
policy is not generally optimal in the presence of borrowing constraints. The random walk case is 
one of several income processes that produce the result. When income is a random walk, it turns 
out that those who wish to borrow but cannot do so typically can do no better than consume their 
incomes (see Deaton (1991)). 
j6This does  not  mean  that  if  liquidity  constraints  are  not  binding  consumption  behaviour  is 
unaffected. Attempts to model liquidity constraints in a more satisfactory manner include 
Mariger (1987), Zeldes  (1989) and Deaton  (1991). In  general, this is  done by 
adding  to  the  consumer's  optimization  problem  an  additional  constraint  (an 
exogenous  quantity  constraint  on  assets  faced  by  consumers)  which  reflects 
limited borrowing opportunities for some consumers. The resulting Euler equation 
for consumption has then an additional term which reflects the shadow price of 
borrowing, that is time dependent. This means that if liquidity constraints affect 
consumers' behaviour along the lines suggested by Zeldes (1989) and others, the 
fraction of liquidity constrained consumers is endogenous and cannot be taken as a 
constant over time.  The problem in this approach is that there is  no  tractable 
closed-form  solution  for  the  purpose  of  estimation.  Furthermore,  attempts  to 
formalize liquidity constraints have not led to directly testable implications for the 
reason  that  the  key  variable, which  is  the  shadow price  of  borrowing, is  not 
observable. Due to these problems, the rule of thumb model with a constant share 
of  liquidity constrained consumers is used  as  a first approximation despite its 
obvious shortcomings and interpretational diffi~ulties.~~ 
Second, distinguishing the effects of  liquidity constraints from other sources 
of misspecification with aggregate data is fairly impossible. Recent research has 
shown  that  the  excess  sensitivity, if  found  in  the  data,  may  also  arise  from 
improper  aggregation  over  consumers  andlor  over  time,  or  from  imposing 
auxiliary restrictions on preferences, like quadratic preferences and the separability 
between consumption and leisure in the utility function, or from ingoring habit 
formation (see Hayashi (1985), Hall (1987), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Gali 
(1990),  Attanasio  and  Weber  (1993),  Goodfriend  (1992),  Pischke  (1995)). 
Moreover, the excess sensitivity can be due to the failure of other assumptions 
required by models based on rational expectations-permanent income hypothesis, 
such  as  consumers'  ability to make rational forecasts of  future income, taxes, 
transfer payments, government consumption and other relevant variables. 
The third problem is related to the second in the sense that to be able to solve 
the second problem, ie to be able to distinguish the effect of liquidity constraints 
from  other  explanations  would  obviously  require  panel  data  on  individual 
households.  The  problem,  however,  is  that  this  kind  of  data  is  not  readily 
available, and even if it were available, liquidity constrained consumers are not 
directly observable. In  the absence of  a direct measure of  liquidity constrained 
consumers  analyses  has  to  be  based  on  various  proxy  variables  and  sample 
splitting  methods  that  in  itself  are  not  without  problems  either  (see  Jappelli 
(1990)). 
Since the problems related to the proper modeling of liquidity constraints in 
an intertemporal maximization framework with rational expectations has proved 
to  raise  nearly  insurmountable  obstacles  at  least  from  the  point  of  view  of 
empirical tractability and due to problems related to proper measurement of  the 
extent of liquidity constraints, there is no attempt in the present study to model 
liquidity constraints endogenously. Instead the primary objective of this chapter is 
to investigate whether the inconsistencies in the parameter structure discussed in 
57To my  knowledge,  only  Jappelli  and  Pagano  (1989),  and  Evans  and  Karras  (1996)  try  to 
investigate the validity  to  interprete the parameter  h  as the  fraction  of  income accruing from 
liquidity constraint consumers in the context of aggregate time series data. The evidence presented 
in these studies support the hypothesis of liquidity constraints. Chapter 4.2 and above could be explained by the excess sensitivity of consumption 
to current income. This is done by using the familiar A-model, which means that 
the results cannot be interpreted as a direct evidence on the prevalence of liquidity 
constraints. This  does not  invalidate the main purpose of  the study, since the 
objective here is not to explain liquidity constraints per se, but to detect whether 
there are any significant deviations from the underlying permanent income model 
derived in Chapter 2.1, of which the excessively high estimates of the parameter PI 
could be an indication. 
Despite the limitations associated with the chosen approach, it has important 
implications when assessing the validity of Ricardian debt neutrality suggested by 
the  results  in  Chapter  4.2.  If  private  consumption is  found  to be  excessively 
sensitive  to  current  income,  the  obvious  consequence  is  that  the  underlying 
permanent income model is misspecified, and that government budget deficits will 
have real effects even if all consumers optimize over an infinite horizon (eg y=l). 
Hence, under excess sensitivity private consumption is not invariant to changes in 
government taxes and transfer policies and the Ricardian equivalence proposition 
fails giving a larger scope for anticyclical fiscal policy. 
5.2  An extended permanent income model (I-model) 
If the excess sensitivity of consumption is at the root of empirical anomalies found 
in  Chapter  4.2, one would  expect that  the inclusion of  current  income  in  the 
consumption function reduces the estimates of the parameter p, that measures the 
propensity to consume out of total expected wealth. This is tested by nesting the 
excess sensitivity hypothesis to the finite horizon permanent income consumption 
function (15) by assuming two types of consumers along the line proposed by Hall 
(1978), Hayashi (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990). Thus, aggregate 
per capita consumption is assumed to be a weighted average with weights A  and 
1- A,  where A denotes the fraction of disposable income accrued by rule of thumb 
consumers and  1-A  denotes  the  fraction  accrued  by  finite  horizon  permanent 
income consumers. For this aggregation to be meaningful, the fraction of  total 
disposable income going to rule of thumb consumers should be relatively stable 
over time. If this is not the case, the rule of thumb model may be misspe~ified.~~ 
Specifically, if  excess sensitivity is assumed to be due to liquidity constraints a 
more plausible assumption would be a variable A in the sense that the willingness 
to borrow  may be stable over time but  the degree of  the constraints can vary 
reflecting  structural  changes  in  the  capital  markets.  Structural  changes  have 
important implications also for the empirical estimation of the constant A-model, 
since if there has occured a structural break over the sample period, the parameter 
estimates and their asymptotic standard errors may be misleading. 
58 In the context of the A-model some evidence suggests that the fraction of income accruing from 
rule of thumb consumers is unlikely LO  remain stable over time (Bayoumi and Koujianou (1989), 
Wirjanto  (1991,  1994, 1997) while others maintain  that  A has been  relatively stable over time 
(Fissel and Jappelli (1990), Campbell and Mankiw (1991)). All in all as noted by Hayashi (1985) 
estimates of  the fraction of income that accrues to 'liquidity constrained consumers'  using panel 
data are more stable, precise, and uniform than are time-series estimates. Direct estimation of  A has the advantage of providing a useful measure of the 
economic importance of deviations from the generalized permanent income model 
(equation 18), and hence, from the Ricardian debt neutrality. If  the estimate of A is 
close to zero and y  close to unity, then one can claim that the forward-looking 
optimizing behaviour and Ricardian equivalence are approximately true even if the 
estimate of A is statistically significant, since most income goes to infinite horizon 
permanent income consumers (see Campbell and Mankiw (1989)). Conversely, if 
the estimate of A is large and statistically significant, then one must conclude that 
the evidence points away from the permanent income hypothesis and Ricardian 
equivalence even if the planning horizon of consumers is infintie, ie y is close to 
unity.59 
Since the rule of thumb consumers are assumed to follow a simple Keynesian 
consumption  function  without  borrowing  and  nonlabour  assets,  their  budget 
constraint implies that  the best they can do is  to consume all their  disposable 
income h:,  defined as h:  = fi  + 77 - ty  and hy  Ah,, where fi,  7;  and ty  denote per 
capita gross labour income, government transfer payments and income taxes of the 
rule of thumb consumers and h, denotes aggregate per capita disposable income. 
Consumption of the rule of thumb consumers c!  is thus 
This formulation implies that it is the amount of current taxes the rule of thumb 
consumers  have  to  pay  and  current  transfers they  obtain that  matter  for their 
consumption decisions, and not the expectations of future fiscal policy or even the 
current government consumption. Since there are no forward looking elements in 
the  consumption  function,  changing  the  timing  of  taxes  and  transfers  would 
change consumption of the rule of thumb consumers. 
Finite horizon permanent income consumers are assumed to maximize their 
intertemporal utility and behave according to the consumption equation (15'). 
where 
59Empirical findings of  this  model  with  values of  A considerably different from  zero  may  be 
consistent with Hall's  findings in certain special situations (see Campbell and Mankiw (1991, p. 
729), Cushing (1992, p. 136)). Equation (15') states that  consumption of  the finite horizon permanent income 
consumers  with  access  to  capital  markets  is  proportional  to  their  expected 
aggregate  wealth.  Since  these  consumers  make  up  (1-A)  of  the  aggregate 
disposable income, h,, they hold (1-A)  of the expected aggregate human wealth, 
E,H,, but hold all of  the financial wealth, q-,,  in the economy. If  A  is zero, the 
model reduces back to equation (15). 
Artificially  nesting the  consumption  of  the two types  of  consumers gives 
aggregate per capita consumption c, as a linear function of the consumption of the 
forward  looking  permanent  income  consumers,  cy  and  the  rule  of  thumb 
consumers, c:.  Formally, total aggregate per capita private consumption c, is given 
by6' 
The implicit assumption in equation (20) is that both types of consumers face the 
same income process, the one faced by  the representative c~nsumer.~'  Equation 
(20) can be used to test the degree to which private consumption corresponds to 
the  forward  looking  optimizing  model  and  the  significance  of  the  excess 
sensitivity of consumption to current income. 
Following the same procedure as in Chapter 2.2,  nonlabour assets q-, are 
eliminated  from the consumption function (20). As  shown in the Appendix  2, 
equation (20) can be written as 
where et  = (YE, +   YE^,). Error terms (E, - El-,)H, and (E, - Et-,)G, reflect the 
revisions in expectations about the sequence of ht+j  and g,+j  that forward-looking 
permanent income consumers make when proceeding from period t- 1  to period t. 
Finally,  the  empirical  reduced  form  consumption  function  that  nests  the 
forward looking optimizing behaviour with the excess  sensitivity hypothesis is 
derived  using  the  method introduced  in  Chapter  3.1. Equation  (22)  gives  the 
extended  aggregate  per  capita  consumption  function  in  terms  of  observable 
variables: 
60See  Appendix 2 for details. 
61This  is a strong assumption which means that the prevalence of liquidity constraints cannot be 
explicitly tested by this kind of formulation. Explicit testing would require disaggregated data on 
liquidity constrained and unconstrained consumers as discussed in Chapter 5.2. where 
The error term v, has the following first-order moving average structure 
Critical assumptions from the point of view of the debt neutrality are whether the 
planning horizon of the forward looking consumers is infinite, ie y=l, and whether 
the fraction of the rule of thumb consumers, A,  is zero. With a positive A a switch 
from tax to debt financing is nonneutral even if consumers are rational and have 
finite horizons (y=l). With A  equal to zero equation (15) instead of (20) can be 
interpreted to be as a valid specification of the consumption function. In this case 
fiscal policy nonneutrality can arise only if the consumers have a finite planning 
horizon, ie O<  y <  1. 
5.3  Estimation results from the A-model 
Estimation results based on a constant A-model are reported in Table 5. The table 
gives the country-specific estimates of PI,  y, 8 and A with their autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The far right hand columns give the 
probability  values  associated  with  the  Hansen's  J-test  for  the  validity  of 
overidentifying restrictions and the significance level of  the Wald-test indicating 
the validity of various theory-generated restrictions imposed. All estimations are 
based  on  an  assumption  of  a  constant real  interest  of  3  %  p.a.  and  that  the 







Unrestricted  .369 
(.558) 
Restrictions 
A=O  .063 
(.536) 
y=l  .258 
(.591) 
0=0  .353 
(.549) 
y=l,e=O,A=O  -292 
(. 1  88) 
Finland 
Unrestricted  .670  ,851  3.450  -.I75  0.992 
(.072)  (.093)  (2.353)  (.414) 
Restrictions 
A=O  .674  .875  3.948  0.966  0.178 
(.070)  (.076)  (2.197)  (0.673) 
y=l  .607  3.393  .I15  0.573  2.539 
(.083)  (1.992)  (.268)  (0.11  1) 
e=o  .789  1.015  .342  0.343  2.150 
(.488)  (.082)  (.382)  (0.142) 
y=1,0=O,A=O  -970  0.354  4.538 
(.  146)  (0.103) Table 5 (continued) 
France 
Unrestricted  .I16  .943 
(. 130)  (.056) 
Restrictions 
A=O  .560  ,989 
(.229)  (.018) 
y=l  .085 
(.264) 
8=0  ,116  .943 
(.  128)  (.056) 
y=1,8=O,A=O  .473 
(.153) 
Germany 
Unrestricted  .261  .974 
(.363)  (.036) 
Restrictions 
a=o  .507  1.052 
(.323)  (.039) 
y=l  .012 
(.390) 
8=0  .379  .981 
(.230)  (.013) 
y=1,8=0,3L=O  .654 
(. 167) 
Greece 
Unrestricted  .363 
(.227) 
Restrictions 
a=o  .876 
(.327) 
y=l  .304 
(.  177) 
8=0  .370 
(.212) 
y=1,8=O,h=O  ,132 
(.  160) 
Italy 
Unrestricted  .312  1.004  .682  SO4  0.064 
(.216)  (.017)  (3.096)  (.162) 
Restrictions 
A=O  .673  1.015  2.740  0.258  9.624 
(.156)  (.012)  (2.349)  (0.002) 
y=l  ,320  .738  ,494  0.110  0.049 
(.217)  (2.970)  (. 158)  (0.825) 
8=0  .310  1.006  .502  0.115  0.048 
(.188)  (.016)  (.131)  (0.826) 
y = 1,8  =0,  A =O  .249  0.245  15.965 
(.  157)  (0.001) Table 5 (continued) 
I3  Y  8  A  P-value  Wald-test 
Netherlands 
Unrestricted  .750  .931  -  1.897  -.042  0.484 
(. 195)  (.029)  (30)  (.  104) 
Restrictions 
a=o  .755  .939  - 1.982  0.556  0.162 
(.175)  (.021)  (.507)  (0.687) 
y=l  ,587  -1.947  .037  0.314  5.575 
(.113)  (.63  1)  (.077)  (0.018) 
8=O  .444  .937  -.227  0.495  11.895 
(. 132)  (.049)  (.  103)  (0.000) 
y=1,8=O,A=O  .474  0.402  23.797 
(.089)  (0.000) 
Sweden 
Unrestricted  .768  .931 
(.343)  (.023) 
Restrictions 
a=o  .677  .937 
(.353)  (.016) 
y=l  -  .029 
(.210) 
8=0  .477  .936 
(.339)  (.026) 
y=1,8=0,A=O  .022 
(. 183) 
UK 
Unrestricted  ,284  1.024  -  1.421  .675  0.081 
(.289)  (.063)  (2.687)  (. 160) 
Restrictions 
a=o  .724  .778  7.494  0.913  17.827 
(.730)  (.108)  (10.274)  (0.000) 
y=l  .315  -  1.299  .662  0.146  0.142 
(.268)  (2.482)  (.149)  (0.706) 
8=0  .211  .992  .720  0.143  0.280 
(.234)  (.065)  (.181)  (0.597) 
y = 1,8 =O, A =O  .649  0.460  21.506 
(.  140)  (0.000) 
Notes: See Table 2. 
As shown in Table 5 the test of the overidentifying restrictions do not reject the 
extended  permanent  income  model,  although  the  probability  value  (P-value) 
associated with the test is quite low in the case of Italy and the UK. At 10 per cent 
significance level the model would be rejected by the J-test for Italy and the UK. In 
general the results turn out to be quite sensitive to the inclusion of  the excess 
sensitivity hypothesis in the estimation equation. As expected, the values of the 
parameter p, are most affected. Estimates  presented  in  Table 5 indicate that  there  are marked  differences 
across countries in the effect of current income on private consumption. The rule 
of thumb consumers' share of disposable income, A,  obtains plausible values and 
is significantly different from zero in half of the countries, ie in France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and the UK, suggesting the importance of  taking into account the 
effect of current income on consumption. The unrestricted estimate of  A  in these 
five countries is large and varies between .43 and .70 so that the effect of current 
income  on  private  consumption  is  the  lowest  in  France  and  the  highest  in 
Germany. Furthermore, the estimated value of  A  and its statistical significance 
remain roughly the same under the hypothesis of an infinite horizon (y=l) as well 
as under the restriction 8=0. As expected, the hypothesis that current income and 
permanent income are equal (A=O) is strongly rejected by the Wald-test in each of 
these countries. 
For Austria and Belgium A is positive and large, but statistically insignificant. 
In Austria the estimate of  A becomes, however, significant and increases in value 
under the restriction y=l as well as under the hypothesis that private consumption 
and government consumption are unrelated (8=0). For Belgium, the value of A and 
its standard error decrease under the restrictions y=l and 8=0. The restriction A=0 
cannot,  however,  be  rejected  for  either  of  the  countries  even  at  10 per  cent 
significance level, so the direct effect of current income on consumption cannot be 
identified. 
For Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden the estimate of A obtains the wrong 
sign, but the values are small and insignificantly different from zero. The same 
result was  found also in the recent  study by  Evans  and Karras  (1996). In the 
Netherlands the estimate of A is not affected by the imposition of other parameter 
restrictions while in Finland and Sweden A becomes positive and quite large under 
the restriction y=l, and under 8=0 for Finland. Although the standard errors also 
decrease, the estimates of  A remain statistically insignificant. The restriction A=0 
cannot be rejected for any of these three countries. 
A rough summary of  the results concerning the parameter  A  is that current 
income  affect  consumption  least  in  the  Netherlands,  Finland  and  Sweden, 
somewhat more  in  Austria and Belgium  and most of  all  in France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and the UK. This pattern of results is to a great extent consistent with 
previous  findings (Jappelli and Pagano  (1989), Campbell  and Mankiw (1991), 
Evans and Karras (1996)) even though the data, econometric methods and sample 
periods are different. Specifically, the effect of current income on consumption has 
been  found insignificant in the Netherlands and Sweden and relatively high in 
France, Greece, Italy and the UK. 
As  regards  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  estimate  of  P, might be  especially 
sensitive  to the  omission  of  current income from the consumption  model,  the 
results give at least a partial support. In  general the unrestricted estimates of  PI 
follow roughly two distinct patterns when the excess sensitivity of consumption is 
accounted for.  First,  for those countries where the estimate of  A  proves  to be 
positive  and statistically significant (ie France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the 
UK),  the  value  of  PI turns  out  to  be  low  or  substantially lower  than  in  the 
specification where the effect of the cull-ent incolne on consu~rlption  was ignored 
(see Table  3 and the line A=0  in Table 5). The unrestricted estimate of  f3,  is, 
however, not statistically different from zero in any of these countries. Second, for 
those  countries  where  the  estimate  of  A  is  very  low  andor  statistically nificant  (ie Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden), the 
value of p, tends to be roughly of the same order of magnitude as obtained in the 
specification ignoring the excess sensitivity hypothesis (Table 3 and the line h=O 
in Table 5). 
All in all the results with respect to the parameter P,  lie roughly in conformity 
with the hypothesis that excess sensitivity of consumption to current income may 
explain  a large part of  the inconsistencies found in the parameter structure in 
Chapter 4.2. For the first group of countries, the results suggest that the estimate of 
p,  is likely to be substantially upward biased when the current income is ignored in 
the consumption function. Obviously, the finite horizon permanent income model 
is not a sufficient approzimation of the reality and consumption behaviour in these 
countries.  For  the  second group of  countries it is harder to draw  any  specific 
conclusions. It seems that the excess sensitivity is not an issue in these countries, 
and the anomalious results concerning the estimates of  p, remain unexplained in 
the  present  setting.  However,  equally plausible  conclusion  would  be  that  the 
simple A-model does not apply to these countries. 
The unrestricted estimates of  y turn out to be close to unity in all but three 
countries,  Finland,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden.  The  restriction  y=l  can  be 
rejected at conventional levels of significance for the Netherlands and Sweden and 
roughly at  10 per cent level for Finland. The estimate of  y  is to some extent 
sensitive to the restriction  h=0 in the  case of  Belgium and the UK.  For both 
countries the  imposition  of  h=O  results in  a  decreased value  of  y  implying a 
shorter (finite) planning horizon. These resulte are in line with the arguments put 
forward by eg Hayashi (1985) and Evans (1988, 1993) that the expectation of  a 
future binding liquidity constraint with a zero borrowing limit is equivalent to a 
shortening of the planning horizon of the consumer. 
The results concerning the unrestricted estimates of 8 are qualitatively much 
the same as those obtained from the forward-looking permanent income model 
(see Table 3). Again, for most countries 8 is not statistically different from zero. In 
fact, the statistical significance of 8 drops in most cases, the only exception being 
the Netherlands where the results are in conformity with those obtained earlier (see 
Table 3). Not  surprisingly, the restriction 8=0 cannot be rejected for any other 
country in the sample except the Netherlands. 
The joint hypothesis of an infinite horizon, the absence of excess sensitivity 
and  no  substitutability  or  complementarity  between  private  and  government 
consumption (ie y=O, h=O and 8=0) cannot be rejected for Austria, Belgium and 
Finland at 5 per cent significance level while at 10 per cent level the restiction is 
rejected for Finland. The restiction is unambigously rejected for France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
To  further test the robustness of  these results  the estimations are also run 
under the restriction of p, = (l+r- y)l(l+r). This restriction is rejected by the Wald- 
test only for Finland and the Netherlands. The estimation results cannot, however, 
be reported for all countries due to lack of convergence. As shown in Table 6 the 
country-specific  P-values  associated  with  the  overidentifying  restrictions  test 
increase  considerably.  More  importantly,  in  most  cases  the  results  remain 
qualitatively the same as obtained from the unrestricted estimations reported in 
Table 5. The notable exception is Belgium, where  the  estimate  of  h  becomes 
statistically significant without any substantial change in its value. Moreover, the restriction A=0  is rejected at  1 per cent significance level. This clearly suggests 
that the excess sensitivity hypothesis is supported also by Belgian data. 
Table 6.  GMM estimation of equation (22) for selected EU 
countries: p,  restricted 
Unrestricted estimates  Wald-test 
Y  8  A  P-value  A=O 
Austria  .929  -5.884  .096  0.756  0.014 
(.  168)  (6.424)  (.809)  (0.905) 
Belgium  .909  11.981  .664  0.969  6.280 
(.077)  (9.894)  (.265)  (0.012) 
France  .934  .201  .421  0.318  17.640 
(.036)  (3.125)  (. 100)  (0.000) 
Germany  .953  1.691  .744  0.754  43.013 
(.053)  (2.141)  (.113)  (0.000) 
Italy  .990  - 1.836  ,375  0.188  10.258 
(.116)  (2.812)  (.117)  (0.001) 
Sweden  .922  1.341  .282  0.968  1.371 
(.071)  (2.3  13)  (.  240)  (0.241) 
Notes: See Table 2. 
To  sum up,  the  inclusion  of  the  excess  sensitivity hypothesis  in  the  forward- 
looking consumption model alters considerably the conclusions made so far on the 
effects of fiscal policy on private consumption and on Ricardian equivalence as a 
valid approximation to reality. The results obtained from the extended permanent 
income model suggest that fiscal policy has been nonneutral in the majority of the 
countries in the sample during the estimation period. Furthermore, deviations from 
the Ricardian debt neutrality seem to arise from excess sensitivity of consumption 
to current income rather than from a shorter planning horizon of consumers. 6  Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this paper was to test whether empirical evidence based on 
aggregate  time-series  data  from  ten  EU  countries  supports  the  Ricardian 
equivalence  hypothesis  or  the  conventional  Keynesian  view  of  the  effects  of 
government deficit financing on aggregate private consumption. The objective was 
also  to  test  whether  there  exists  substitutability or  complementarity  between 
private consumption and government consumption in these countries. 
The effects of  fiscal policy on private consumption-saving decisions is first 
investigated in a generalized permanent income framework with finite planning 
horizons  and  government  consumption  as  a  direct  conveyer  of  utility  to 
consumers. Given the limitations of  aggregate time series data, the results from 
this  model  seem to give a  strong support for an  infinite planning horizon  for 
consumers and thus, for Ricardian debt neutrality in six out of ten countries in the 
sample. The validity of  this outcome is, however, not without doubts, since the 
high propensity to consume out of  total expected wealth, that was found in the 
study, is not compatible with an infinite planning horizon but in fact, suggests a 
rather  short one. The findings  also indicate  that  during the  estimation  period 
government  consumption  and  private  consumption  tended  to  be  unrelated  or 
complements rather than substitutes. 
Due to the inconsistency in the results the validity of Ricardian equivalence 
was checked by nesting the excess sensitivity hypothesis to the permanent income 
model. The inclusion of the direct effect of current income on consumption altered 
the results markedly. The findings suggest that aggregate consumption responds 
not  only  to  the  changes  in  the  expected  lifetime  wealth  as  predicted  by  the 
generalized permanent income model, but also to changes in current income in six 
out of ten countries in the sample. Since private consumption is not invariant to 
changes in  government taxes  and transfer policies under  excess  sensitivity, the 
Ricardian equivalence proposition fails in these countries. Besides this, Ricardian 
equivalence is shown to fail due to shorter (finite) planning horizons in two more 
countries. 
All  in  all the results suggest that fiscal policy  has been nonneutral in the 
majority  of  the  countries  studied  during  the  estimation  period.  Furthermore, 
deviations from the Ricardian debt neutrality seem to arise from excess sensitivity 
of consumption to current income rather than from shorter planning horizons on 
the part of consumers. References 
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Aggregating the individual flow budget constraint (3) over all generations gives 
the aggregate per capita flow budget constraint in terms of private consumption 
From equation (1 1) human wealth in period t can be expressed as 
Y  h, =EtHt  - -EtHt+, 
1  +r  (A21 
Substituting the consumption function (15) and equation (A2) into (Al)  gives 
Y  at=-Po+(l  -P1)E,H,--EtHt+,-P,~EtG,+(1  +r)(l -P1)a,,+0gt 
1  +r  (A31 
Lagging (A3) by one period and multiplying both sides by (l+r) yields 
After rearranging and manipulating equation (A4) the total expected wealth can be 
expressed as follows 
Equation (A5) can be rewritten as 
where 
eHt=  (Et-Et.,)Ht 
and reflect  the  revisions  of  expectations  about  ht+j and  g,+j that  consumers  make 
between period t- 1 and t. 
Equation (15) in the text implies that 
Lagging (A7) and rearranging yields 
Substituting (A8) into (A6) yields 
where 
E,=  Y €Ht +  Y  ~EG,. 
Substituting (A9) into (A7) gives the expression for aggregate per capita private 
consumption. Appendix 2 
Aggregate per capita consumption c, over the two types of  consumers given by 
equation (20) in the text is 
Economy-wide aggregate per capita flow budget constraint is given by 
at=ht+(l+r)at-,-c,  (B1) 
Aggregate per capita human wealth h, in period t over the two types of consumers 
can be expressed as 
Substituting the consumption function (20) and equation (B2) into (B 1) gives 
Lagging (B3) by one period and multiplying both sides by (l+r) yields 
Total  expected  wealth  accruing  from  the  forward-looking  permanent  income 
consumers is given by 
Using (B5) and equation (B4) the total expected wealth accruing from forward- 
looking permanent income consumers can be expressed as follows Equation (B6) can be rewritten as 
where 
cHt=  (Et  -E,,)H, 
and 
eGt=  (Et-Et-JGt 
reflect  the  revisions  of  expectations  about  ht+j and  g,+j that  consumers  make 
between period t- 1 and t. 
Equation (20) implies that 
Lagging (B8) and rearranging yields 
Substituting (B9) into (B6) yields 
where 
ct=  Y  €Ht +  Y  0€Gt. 
Substituting (B10) into (B8) gives the expression for aggregate per capita private 
consumption (equation (21) in the text), Appendix 3 
Time series properties of the data 
Based on the theory of cointegrated processes, recent research on consumption has 
been conducted in level form.62  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  (1979) tests for unit 
roots  as  well  as  Johansen's  maximum  likelihood  tests  for  cointegration were 
performed  to check whether estimation of  equations (18) and (22) in levels is 
appropriate. 
Table A1 presents the results of  augmented Dickey-Fuller  tests of the null 
hypothesis that each series has one unit root and of the null that its first difference 
has one unit root. 
The test results indicate that the null hypothesis that each series in levels has 
one unit root cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level for all but two of the series tested. 
The null hypothesis that  each first-differenced series has  one unit  root  can be 
rejected for all series at the 0.05 level only for the UK. However, roughly at the 
0.10 level, the null can be rejected for all series also for Austria and Sweden. The 
results  suggest that the series b, is integrated of  order two in Belgium, Finland, 
Germany,  Greece  and  the  Netherlands.  The  I(2)ness  is,  however,  clearly  an 
implausible result suggesting that the real per capita government debt would be in 
an  explosive path  and consequently, leading to unsustainable government debt 
positions in the long term in these countries. The government debt has grown 
rapidly  in  several European countries  during  the  1980s and  early  1990s. The 
growth rate of the debt has, however, started to slow down in all countries due to 
comprehensive measures taken in order to consolidate public finances and to fulfil 
the convergence criteria required for the third stage of the European Monetary and 
Economic Union. The combined effect of these events seems to have been that the 
debt series has undergone structural breaks which may cause the standard unit root 
test - which do not allow for the possibility of one or more structural breaks under 
the  null  and  alternative hypotheses - to  have  low  power  (see Perron  1989). 
Moreover, these same qualifications apply to some extent to several other series in 
the  sample,  but  particularly  so to  private  consumption  and  income  series  in 
Finland that experienced considerable breaks in the early 1990s, that may cause 
the series to appear as trend stationary,63  as well as to income series in Belgium, 
France  and  Italy  with  considerable  breaks  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  and  to 
government consumption series in Sweden with breaks during the 1990s. Due to 
these breaks the series (excluding the Finnish data) appear to be integrated of order 
two instead of an economically more plausible of order one. Hence, the evidence 
regarding the magnitude of the root in these series is treated as inconclusive and 
further analyses are conducted assuming that all series are I(1) variables. 
The results for cointegration are given in Table A2 for the 1(1) variables and 
instruments  used  in  the  estimations. Tests  for  cointegration  are based  on  the 
62See  eg Evans (1988), Leiderman and Razin (1988), Graham and Himarios (1991, 1996), Himarios 
(1995). 
63When the years  1991-1995  are excluded from the sample, the unit root hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for both series in levels. Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood estimation procedure with two lags in the 
VAR, which produces white noise residuals. 
Table A 1.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for selected EU 
countries 
Variable  Levels  First differences 
ADF (1)  ADF(1) 
Austria  1962- 1994  1963- 1994 
C  t  -  1.893  -3.962 
ht  -  1.635  -2.213 
h:  -2.887  -4.221 
Yt  -  P .940  -2.106 
gt  -  1.089  -2.074 
b  t  -  1.994  -2.012 


























Germany  1962- 1993  1963- 1993 
Ct  -2.043(2)  -4.522 
ht  -2.453  -3.848 
h:  -2.853  -3.667 
Yt  -2.880  -4.234 
gt  -2.203  -2.857 
bt  -0.05 l(4)  -0.491 
?  -  1.667  -3.396 Table A1 continues 
Variable  Levels  First differences 
ADF (1)  ADF(1) 
Greece  1962- 1994  1963- 1994 
Ct  -2.128  -  3.065 
ht  -1.618  -4.385 
Yt  -  1.690  -4.095 
gt  -  1.573  -  2.425 
bt  -1.781 
6  -1.991  -3.658 
Italy  1963- 1994  1964- 1994 
Ct  -3.544  -3.615 
ht  -2.098  -2.108(2) 
h:  -2.624  -2.559 
Yt  -1.180  -  1.694 
gt  -  1.757  -2.353 
bt  -  0.847  -2.191 
G  -0.685  -  1.434 
Netherl.  1963  -  1994  1964- 1994 
Ct  -  1.987  -  2.923 
ht  -  1.961  -3.643 
Yt  -2.436  -2.737 
gt  -2.164  -2.953 
bt  -2.563  -  1.667 
tt  -2.343  -3.135 
Sweden  1963  -  1994  1964- 1994 
Ct  -2.006  -3.395(2) 
ht  -  2.923  -  5.093 
h:  -2.272  -3.562 
Yt  -  1.889  -  3.644 
gt  -  1.963(2)  -  1.644 
bt  -2.516  -2.969 
4  -  1.992  -3.305(2) 
UK  1962- 1994  1963- 1994 
Ct  -2.447  -3.678 
ht  -2.581  -3.877 
h:  -2.611  -3.808 
Yt  -2.762  -3.213 
gt  -  1.929  -4.849 
bt  -  1.833  -3.849 
6  -2.712  -4.006 
Notes:  ADF(1)  is  the  ADF  statistic  of  order  1,  if  not  otherwise 
indicated; the critical values of the ADF statistics are from MacKinnon 
(1991), the 0.05 critical value for the sample 1962- 1993 is -3.556, for 
the sample 1962- 1994 -3.55 1, for the sample 1962- 1995 -3.547, for 
the sample 1963- 1993 -3.561, for the sample 1963- 1994 -2.959, for 
the sample 1963- 1995 -2.953, and for the sample 1964- 1993 -2.963. 
Including  additional  lags  did  not  affect  the  results.  The  variables 
included are: private consumption ct, disposable non-property income 
ht, disposable total personal income h:,  non-property income y,, general 
government consumption gt, general  government  debt  bt, household 
income taxes 4.  All variables are expressed in per capita real terms. According to the trace test (Table A2) the hypothesis of cointegration is rejected at 
the conventional 5 % significance level for all countries in the sample. Given the 
small  sample  sizes,  the  10 per  cent  significance level  could  be  regarded  as 
adequate for the nonrejection of cointegration. At 10 per cent level, the hypothesis 
of cointegration cannot be rejected for all but two countries, Germany and Greece. 
The trace test is, however, sufficiently close to significance at the 10 per cent level 
to treat the variables as cointegrated also for these two countries. 
Because of  the upward  trend  in  c,,  y,,  g,,  b,  and  t, the  condition  that  the 
unconditional mean of their first-differences is non-zero is also fulfilled. 
Table A2.  Johansen's maximum likelihood tests for cointegration 
Eigenvalue  Null  Trace  0.05 critical  0.10 critical 
hypothesis  value  value 
[c,h,gl 
Austria (h,)  0.385  r=O  25.20  29.7  26.8 
0.228  rs  B  9.16  15.4  13.3 
0.018  1.22  0.59  3.8  2.7 
Belgium (h,)  0.5  11  r = 0  28.27  29.7  26.8 
0.119  rs  1  5.34  15.4  13.3 
0.039  rs2  1.27  3.8  2.7 
Finland (h:)  0.364  P=O  26.66  29.7  26.8 
0.253  rs  1  11.27  15.4  13.3 
0.038  r22  1.33  3.8  2.7 
France (h:)  0.504  r=O  28.76  29.7  26.8 
0.199  rs  1  7.73  15.4  13.3 
0.035  rs2  1.07  3.8  2.7 
Germany (h:)  0.334  r = 0  23.98  29.7  26.8 
0.199  rsl  10.98  15.4  13.3 
0.114  rs2  3.86  3.8  2.7 
Greece (h,)  0.342  r = 0  23.89  29.7  26.8 
0.214  rs  1  10.06  15.4  13.3 
0.06 1  1-22  2.09  3.8  2.7 
Italy (h:)  0.495  r = 0  28.72  29.7  26.8 
0.154  rsli  6.87  15.4  13.3 
0.046  rs2  1.52  3.8  2.7 
Netherlands (h,)  0.455  r = 0  28.58  29.7  26.8 
0.194  rs  1  9.13  15.4  13.3 
0.067  rs2  2.24  3.8  2.7 
Sweden (h:)  0.414  r = 0  32.21  29.7  26.8 
0.242  rs  1  15.12  15.4  13.3 
0.177  rs2  6.23  3.8  2.7 
Notes: All equations are estimated assuming that the data do not contain a deterministic trend. Lag 
length of two was used to remove autocorrelation in the residuals. Critical values for the trace tests 
are obtained from Johansen (1988). Appendix 4 
Data 
The  data  are  from  OECD  National  Accounts,  Vol.  I., covering  the  period 
1960- 1994 for Austria, Greece and the UK, the period 196  1  -  1994 for Belgium, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, the period 1960- 1995 for Finland, the period 
1960- 1993 for  Germany and the period  1961  -  1993 for France. The data  for 
Germany refer to West Germany until 199  1 and the united Germany thereafter. All 
variables are in per capita terms and deflated by  the implicit price deflator of 
which the base year for Greece is  1970, for France 1980, for Belgium and Italy 
1985, and for Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK  1990. In 
panel  estimations the base year  for all countries in the sample is  1990 and the 
variables are expressed in US dollars. 
Private consumption c,: private final consumption expenditure. 
Disposable  non-property income  h,:  the  sum  of  household  sector  wages, 
salaries, employers'  social security contributions and other non-property income 
(ie operating surplus of private unincorporated businesses and withdrawals from 
quasi-corporate enterprises) plus government transfer payments to households less 
household  income  taxes  and  other  direct  taxes,  employees'  social  security 
contributions and fees, fines and penalties. 
Disposable total personal income h::  total personal income (incl. government 
transfer payments), net income taxes. 
Government  consumption  g,:  general  government  final  consumption 
expenditure. 
Price deflator: the ratio of final private consumption expenditures at current 
prices to the value of these expenditures at the base-year prices. 
Population: end-of-year total population. 
Instruments 
Austria, Belgium: the  second and third lag of  private consumption, disposable 
non-property income, and government consumption. 
Finland:  a  constant,  the  second  and  third  lag  of  private  consumption, 
disposable  total  personal  income,  government  consumption  and  the  dummy 
variable D9  1  -  93 obtaining the value one in 199  1  -  1993 and zero otherwise. 
France, Germany: the second and third lag of private consumption, disposable 
total personal income, and government consumption. 
Greece,  the  Netherlands:  the  second  through  fourth  lag  of  private 
consumption and disposable non-property income, and the second and third lag of 
government consumption. 
Italy:  the  second  and  third  lag  of  private  consumption,  disposable  total 
personal income, government consumption, and general government debt. 
Sweden: the second through fourth lag of private consumption, the second 
and third lag of disposable total personal income, and government consumption. The UK: the second through fourth lag of private consumption and disposable 
total personal income, and the second and third lag of government consumption. SUOMEN PANKIN KESKUSTELUALOITTEITA 
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